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Introduction
The idea that culture is a determinant of economic outcomes has regained in recent economic
literature its full recognition.1 Neoclassical economics, in its assumption of rationality of economic
agents, has excluded any role for values and beliefs in determining economic behavior of individuals.
In recent years, however, academic literature devoted increasing importance to cultural economics,
trying to disentangle cultural roots of economic outcomes such as economic growth (see, for instance,
Fukuyama, 2001), regional development (see, for example, Tabellini 2008), di¤usion of innovations
(see, among others, Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2009; Capello, Caragliu and Nijkamp, 2011), labour
market performance (see, for instance, Algan and Cahuc, 2007, Casey and Dustman, 2010), trade
and economic exchange (see Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2009; Disdier et Mayer, 2007). The main
obstacles to rigorous analysis of cultural economics have been the a priori vague notion of culture
and the di¢ culty in measuring it. Such obstacles are increasingly overcome. On the one hand the
concept of culture has been formalized in its di¤erent facets in the economic literature. On the
other hand the availability of richer datasets2 allows quantitative analysis dening the importance
of cultural aspects in economic phenomena (see Throsby, 1994, for a comprehensive discussion).
More specically, Throsby (1995) proposes a twofold denition of "Culture". On the one side
it is considered "a set of activities, including all those activities undertaken within the so called
cultural industries. j...j Culture in this functional sense can be thought of as being represented
by the cultural sector of the economy."3 This rst denition of culture is based on the UNESCO
(2009) denition of cultural goods as those "Consumer goods that convey ideas, symbols and ways
of life, i.e. books, magazines, multimedia products, software, recordings, lms, videos, audio-visual
programmes, crafts and fashion". On the other side "Culture" is dened as "a set of attitudes,
practices and beliefs that are fundamental to the functioning of di¤erent societies. Culture in this
1See Ninth Luca Dagliano Lecture in Development Economics (Nov., 28th 2011), The Role of Cultural Diversity
in Growth and Development: What do Economists Have to Say about This?, Thierry Verdier, Paris School of
Economics. The concept of culture was widely used by classical economists, but it was put aside by neoclassical
paradigm.
2See for example the European Social Survey, the European Values Study, which represent the two databases
used in the analysis that follows.
3See Throsby (1995), as reported by Thorsby (1999), p. 6.
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constituent sense is expressed in a particular societys values and customs".4 The analysis that
follows considers both sides of culture: its "functional sense" (in chapter 1 and chapter 2) and its
"constituent sense" (chapter 3). In doing so this study aims at discussing the impact of cultural
diversity on economic outcomes and disentangling the mechanisms through which economic forces
of globalization (trade, migration and capital ows) interplay with local cultural identities. Note
that the analysis has a specic geographical focus, i.e.: European countries. The choice of Europe as
target of the analysis depends on 2 main considerations: cultural issues are particularly important
for the socio-economic success of European Union and cultural diversity is a funding element of
Europe. Indeed, a recent Eurobarometer survey on "European Cultural Values"5 highlighted that,
regardless of how it is dened, culture holds a prominent place in the lives of Europeans: 77 % 6
of respondents answered that culture was important to them. This percentage is even higher when
measured among people educated at least until the age of 20 (over that sample of surveyed persons
the percentage rises to 89 %). At the same time, 84.8% of respondents believe that "Cultural
diversity is a value that is best embodied in Europe". Moreover, an other Eurobarometer round
on National and European Identity7 show that over 63% of respondent have a connection with
foreign cultures,8 either because of personal experience or because of foreign friends or relatives.
The importance of cultural diversity has been recognized more generally also by UNESCO in its
Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity (2001), stating that "Culture takes diverse forms across
time and space. This diversity is embodied in the uniqueness and plurality of identities of the groups
and societies making up human kind. As a source of exchange, innovation and creativity, cultural
diversity is as necessary for human kind as biodiversity is for nature(see UNESCO, 2001, Article
1).
Culture and cultural diversity are thus two important elements of European societies, but why
should they matter in an economic perspective? The analysis that follows gives three main answers
4See Throsby (1995), as reported by Thorsby (1999), p. 6.
5See Eurobarometer 67.1 (2007)
6The exact question of the poll was: "How important is culture to you personally?" and the percentage represent
people who answered either "Very important" or "Fairly important".
7Eurobarometer 73.3 on "National and European Identity, Electromagnetic Fields and Health" (2010)
8 In particular this percentage refers to the persons surveyed that had either "relatives living abroad" or "friends
living abroad" or "lived abroad" or a "partner of a di¤erent citizenship" or "worked abroad" or "studied abroad".
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to this question. First of all, some of our economic choices and actions as consumers can have an
important fallout on cultural diversity and on the possibility of cohabitation of di¤erent cultures.
Secondly, some economic phenomena can have a cultural content, such as trade in cultural goods.
For this reason they can become a vehicle for intercultural exchange, fostering tolerance towards im-
migrants and easing the success of multicultural societies. Finally, di¤erent local cultural identities
can act as a lter for economic phenomena such as foreign investments, magnifying or destroying
the growth enhancing e¤ect of economic globalization. These three explanations are discussed and
analyzed in the three chapters of the thesis.
The rst chapter, indeed, starts from the following research questions: do trade in cultural goods
and immigration threaten national culture, promoting worldwide homogenization? Is there, on the
contrary, a preference for diversitythat we can leverage to preserve the heterogeneity of cultures?
Can the production and consumption of heterogeneous cultural goods lead to a more tolerant
society? In answering to these questions, it proposes a theoretical model where globalization, in the
form of greater cultural goodstrade integration, can increase cultural diversity, leveraging the "love
for diversity" of open minded individuals. Higher cultural diversity in production/ consumption
patterns can decrease integration costs for all individuals of the society. A lower integration cost
fosters positive attitudes towards immigrants in the hosting society. The paper describes a simple
two-countries model, where the economy is composed of two cultural sectors (local culture and
ethnic culture) and a non cultural sector. There exist only one factor of production, i.e. labor,
and the model concentrates on the cultural goods industry (see UNESCO, 2009). The innovative
and crucial ingredients of the model are mainly two. First of all there exist 2 possible types of
consumers: "open-minded" individuals, who are characterized by love for cultural variety in their
utility function, and "closed-minded" individuals, who instead consume only local goods. The two
types of persons di¤er not only in the way they value consumption, but also social exchange.
While closed-minded individuals experience a positive cultural externality only when they match
with people of their same type and culture, open-minded individuals enjoy a positive externality
when they match with other open-minded individual of all cultures. This second element links
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closed-minded individual to a geographical identity, while open-minded individuals have a cross-
geographic identity characterized by the taste for diversity. The second crucial ingredient of the
model refers instead to the production side of the economy. While production settings largely draws
from the seminal work of Krugman (1980), the only di¤erence lies in the idea that xed cost of
production of ethnic cultural goods is decreasing in the number of people consuming the good:
cultural goods are indeed "credence goods" for which quality is "dependent on what other people
think" and "socio-psychological e¤ects favour products that have already become known in some
way" (see Choi et al., 1999, p. S63). Leveraging the "love for variety" of open minded individuals
(that split their consumption among the highest possible number of varieties) and considering
the special cost structure just described for the production of foreign cultural goods (where xed
cost are lower the larger the consumer base) leads to a framework where, under free trade, the
number of varieties increases, increasing cultural diversity. In a comparative static exercise it is
possible to see that, if the increase in the number of varieties is su¢ ciently high, the integration
cost decreases enough that the overall impact of immigrants on social welfare is positive. Indeed,
if the number of immigrants exogenously increases, welfare of open minded individuals depends
on the interplay between the increase in their positive cultural externality (which increases in
the number of open minded immigrants present in the country) and the increase in the integration
cost. Welfare of closed minded individuals instead always decreases with the increase in immigration
inows. However, if the number of varieties is su¢ ciently high, the integration cost (which decreases
with the number of varieties produced) becomes negligible and social welfare can increase with the
increase in immigration. Thus, to the initial question of whether cultural diversity matters in
an economic perspective, this chapter answers that cultural diversity is strongly tied to economic
choices because some of our actions as consumers can inuence the cultural dimension of the society
we live in, having an important impact on our broad understanding of other cultures. Moreover, this
paper o¤ers a theoretical framework to analyze the potential welfare increasing e¤ects of cultural
globalization. Indeed, it argues that multiculturalism can succeed without necessarily reducing
diversity in the integration process. This is possible if multicultural societies cultivate a new kind
of identity that transcends geographical borders and is grounded on openness towards di¤erent
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cultures and love for diversity.
The second part of the analysis takes one step further and shows in an empirical analysis that
some economic phenomena, such as trade in cultural goods, can become a vehicle for intercultural
exchange, fostering tolerance towards immigrants. The following research questions are the starting
point of this second chapter: can cultural factors emerge in economic choices? Can the experience
of foreign cultural goods act as a bridge among cultures, favoring coexistence of di¤erent ethnic
groups in a multicultural society? Can trade in cultural goods foster positive attitudes towards
immigration? To answer these question the paper proposes an empirical analysis on the role that
cultural factors can have in shaping attitudes towards immigrants. Results provide evidence that
enhanced "active exposure" to cultural goods imported from abroad can signicantly increase the
probability of being pro-immigration. The analysis is based on data from the European Social
Survey on individual attitudes towards immigration and data from UN-Comtrade on cultural goods
imports. In particular, exposure to foreign cultural goods is measured as the average number
of trading partners from which each country imported at least one cultural good in the 3 years
preceding the interview. Moreover, by using the expression "active exposure" I want to underline
the importance of considering the individual specic ability enjoy foreign cultural goods that may
reach a country. For this reason the analysis focuses on the e¤ect of imports mediated by years of
education of each individual, following the econometric strategy proposed by Facchini and Mayda
(2009). Results show that, controlling for individual relevant characteristics and country level
unobserved heterogeneity, exposure to higher cultural diversity increases peoples tolerance towards
immigration. More specically, an active exposureto foreign cultural goods can have a positive
e¤ect on attitudes towards immigrants because heterogeneity in consumption patterns can lead to
higher tolerance towards a more heterogeneous population. This e¤ect is stronger, indeed, when
considering attitudes towards immigrants of a di¤erent race/ethnicity as the majority of the native
population. Moreover, this e¤ect is explained by an increased awareness of the cultural enrichment
that immigrants bring along, leading to an increase of welfare of natives. Results are robust to
more disaggregated regional controls and in particular, the positive e¤ect of active exposure to
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foreign books and newspapers is driven by individuals living in big cities, where such goods are
more widespread. The positive e¤ect of active exposure to foreign movies and works of art, instead,
is more pervasive in the whole population. Results are also robust to possible endogeneity arising
from omitted variables bias or reverse causality. Indeed, although in principle unobserved individual
heterogeneity should be mitigated by the use of country level variables, when studying their impact
on individual behavior and opinions it is di¢ cult to avoid possible reverse causality due to the fact
that the relationship between consumption of cultural goods and attitudes towards migration could
be a self reinforcing process. For this reason, I introduce instrumental variable techniques in the
analysis: the index of exposure to foreign cultural goods is instrumented using the overall number of
museums present in the country, specialized stores selling newspapers and booksretailers. Results
are conrmed also in this case. Having said that, why should cultural diversity matter in an
economic perspective? This second chapter shows that cultural diversity is important in economics
because some economic phenomena can have a cultural content. Cultural goods, indeed, can become
a vehicle for intercultural exchange, fostering tolerance towards immigrants and easing the success
of multicultural societies.
The concept of cultural diversity in its constituent sense is introduced in the last chapter of
the thesis, which presents an empirical analysis arguing that the variety of attitudes, practices
and beliefs characterizing di¤erent societies within European regions are crucial for the success of
local economies in taking advantage of globalization. Indeed, di¤erent local identities can magnify
or destroy the growth enhancing e¤ect of foreign direct investments, one of the main vehicles of
economic globalization. The main research questions this last chapter discusses are: what is the
role played by FDI in fostering economic growth at the sub national level (EU27-NUTSII regions)?
Does FDI structural characteristics (sector a¢ liation and origin) matter for regional growth? Is
this relationship linear? Can an element of regional identity, purely local, such as territorial capital,
shape the impact of global forces, such as FDI, on local development? The traditional approach to
discuss the relation between FDI and regional growth is based on theoretical arguments regarding
the likely sources of knowledge and technological spillovers from foreign direct investment (FDI)
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and issues concerning the role these spillovers can play in fostering growth and development at
regional level. The impact of FDI on growth is expected to go beyond its contribution to local
production capacity, stimulating productivity gains resulting from spillovers to local rms. While
technology may widespread through several channels, FDI is one of the main mechanism through
which host economies can gain access to advanced technologies as well as managerial knowledge and
skills. This may help in increasing development opportunities for regions. These arguments are very
common in the literature based on country level evidence and do not consider that, at sub-national
level, the FDI-growth relationship becomes more ambiguous. What this last chapter argues is that
at the regional level there exist important local factors that can undermine or reinforce the growth
enhancing e¤ect of FDI. The analysis concentrates on the role of a combination of informal factors
characterizing local cultures recently dened in the literature as the soft components of territorial
capital (See Camagni, 2008). The paper starts from a simple model that denes the theoretical
mechanism through which territorial capital inuence the FDI-growth relationship in a neoclassical
framework. Then it assesses the impact of FDI on economic growth empirically, testing and con-
trolling for possible endogeneity. Additionally, it introduces those soft components of the territorial
capital that may exert an impact on the transmission of FDI induced spillovers to the local econ-
omy, such as social capital and relational territorial capital and closeness of the region. Territorial
capital in this context is viewed as a non traditionalabsorptive factor. In particular, "general-
ized morality" (see Tabellini, 2008) is considered to potentially improve the business environment,
reducing transaction and contract-enforcement costs. Moreover, relational capital (see Capello et
al., 2011) may facilitate the di¤usion of information, thus reducing information asymmetries. In
addition, closed(/open) social capital is dened as the lack of openess of a region towards external
and diverse contributions9 and it can make foreign rms embeddedness more di¢ cult (/easier). The
paper also considers separately the e¤ect of di¤erent types of FDI inows, decomposed according
to macro-sectors of activity and broad geographic origin. The empirical analysis is based on a
variety of datasets. Data on foreign direct investments are available from the FDIRegio database,
a database built up from Amadeus database (Bureau Van Dijk). FDI ows are dened as newly
9both in terms of other regions, other European countries and production factors coming from abroad.
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created rms whose percentage of assets owned by non-residents was at least 10%. The number
of new foreign rms undertaken in all EU27 NUTS II regions has been further disaggregated by
sectors of activity (manufacturing and services) and origin of the investors (intra- and extra-Europe
FDI). The European Values Study database (1999/2000 wave of the survey), following Van Schaik
(2002), Capello et al. (2011), and Caragliu and Nijkamp (2012) has been used in order to esti-
mate territorial capital indexes and Eurostat regional database for all other controls. The empirical
analysis also takes into account possible endogeneity that may derive from a variety of reasons:
persistency of FDI variable, reverse causality and omitted variable bias. In doing so specic con-
trols have been introduced, such as initial regional gdp, while instrumental variable techniques have
been applied. In particular, the set of instruments introduced in the analysis and are: number of
newly established rms in European regions in the period 1997-1999 (i.e. 8 year before the period
of interest), second and third order spatial lag of GDP inows in 2005-2007 (built using a contiguity
matrix). Their exogeneity and relevance are conrmed by rst stage diagnostic. Results show that
regions with a higher concentration of FDI yield a growth premium. Moreover, regionsidentity is
conducive for FDI-growth e¤ect: indeed, generalized morality/ trustworthiness amplies the FDI
growth e¤ect, while relational capital exert more ambiguous e¤ect on the impact of FDI on regions
growth, the network e¤ect being inclusive and exclusive at the same time for di¤erent actors.
These results are very important in a policy perspective, as they imply rst of all that FDI can be a
signicant source of growth for local economies: such aspect of globalization is crucial also for local
policy makers. Moreover, the analysis shows that foreign investments impact is a¤ected by local
conditions and in particular by the cultural dimension of local business environment: investments
on building a solid social capital in a region may be very important also for its economic returns.
To conclude, this analysis shows that culture and cultural diversity can be very important in
economics and ignoring this dimension in economic analysis may prevent a full understanding of
some economic phenomena. Indeed, on the one side some choices of economic agents can have a
cultural content and this can be leveraged for social welfare increases and on the other hand cultural
dynamics can shape the consequences of economic phenomena.
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1 Trade in cultural goods, cultural diversity and integration
costs: can multicultural societies succeed?
This paper studies the role of cultural factors in shaping protectionist attitudes towards trade and
immigration. In particular it provides a simple theoretical framework where globalization, in the
form of greater cultural goods trade integration, can increase cultural diversity and reduce the
costs of immigration. The fundamental feature the model attempts to capture is that by leveraging
the taste for diversity in consumption of foreign cultural goods, globalization can increase cultural
diversity and foster positive attitudes towards immigrants and the cultural enrichment they bring
along.
1.1 Introduction
Fear of threats over national identity are intensifying in Europe, fuelled by rising xenophobic par-
ties that claim globalization is eroding national cultures. Indeed, the increasing support of anti-
globalization movements appears to be grounded more on concerns over national identity and
culture than on economic cost-benet analysis. "Culture matters more" (The Economist, Aug 11th
2010) and the success of far right movements in Europe lies in their ght against multiculturalism
to preserve indigenous traditions. Indeed, these movements are gaining ground "in spite of their
inability to provide a coherent economic message".
In this perspective, aside from purely economic considerations, the impact of globalization and
market integration are increasingly discussed from the point of view of culture and national identity,
both at the political and at the academic level. Two specic aspects of globalization are mainly
relevant in this context: trade in cultural goods and immigration. Their importance lies in their
ability to a¤ect tastes and values of the hosting society, possibly undermining cultural diversity
by contaminating and diluting local cultures. The question is thus: do trade in cultural goods
and immigration threaten national culture, promoting worldwide homogenization? Is there, on the
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contrary, a "preference for diversity" we can leverage to preserve the heterogeneity of cultures? Can
the production and consumption of heterogeneous cultural goods lead to a more tolerant society?
Following the view developed by Cowen (2002), this paper argues that diversity can be pre-
served within the European society rather than across European societies: sometimes "cultural
homogenization and heterogeneization are not alternatives or substitutes, rather they tend do come
together" (see Cowen, 2002). Indeed, the potential for multicultural societies to succeed lies in
their ability to preserve cultural diversity in the integration process. This is possible only if they
cultivate a new kind of identity that transcends geographical borders and is funded on the respect
of di¤erent cultures, openness towards them, freedom of expression and love for diversity.
This paper contributes to existing literature by providing a simple theoretical framework where
globalization, in the form of trade integration, can increase cultural diversity and reduce the in-
tegration costs of immigration. The fundamental feature the model attempts to capture is that
leveraging the taste for diversity in the consumption of foreign cultural goods, trade in cultural
goods can increase cultural diversity and foster positive attitudes towards immigrants and the
cultural enrichment their cultures brought along.
The most important di¤erence between this paper and previous literature (see for instance
Janeba, 2007, Olivier et al., 2008, Rauch and Trinidade, 2009) is the idea that welfare-increasing
social exchange and network externalities can take place also between di¤erent cultures and not
only within a given culture, depending on di¤erent tastes for cultural heterogeneity. The simple
theoretical framework introduced here is a two countries-three sectors-one factor model where a
cultural externality can take place either within each culture or across di¤erent cultures. The two
countries di¤er in their population structure, i.e. initial endowments of di¤erent population types.
In particular there exist 2 possible types of consumers: "open-minded" individuals are characterized
by love for cultural variety in their utility function while "closed-minded" individuals consume only
local goods. Another important di¤erence in the two groups preferences lies in the way they
value not only consumption, but also social exchange. While closed-minded individuals experience
a positive cultural externality when they match10 with people of their same type and culture,
10The random matching process is dened as in Olivier et al. (2008).
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open-minded individuals enjoy a positive externality when they match with other open-minded
individuals of all cultures. This second element links closed-minded individual to a geographical
identity, while open-minded individuals have a cross-geographic identity characterized by the taste
for diversity. The three industries are fundamentally di¤erent: one produces a homogeneous local
cultural good, which is non tradable, the second produces a di¤erentiated tradable cultural product
that can be viewed as ethnic production and the third is a homogeneous non cultural tradable
product, which can be seen as the rest of the economy. The model concentrates on the cultural goods
industry. It combines a "love-for-variety" feature à-la-Krugman (1980) with the existence of cultural
externalities introduced, for example, in Olivier et al. (2008)11 . It also exploits the Armington
(1969) assumption of good di¤erentiation on the basis of the country of origin of production, but
in this context the notion is slightly modied. In particular, since we are talking about cultural
goods it is not the country of origin of the good that matters but the culture of origin that denes
di¤erent varieties. Each country thus originates a culture, but the production of its corresponding
cultural good can be located in any country, depending on the availability of factor endowments.
The idea that globalization breaks the deterministic link between geographical specication
and cultural experience is recognized also by UNESCO: "One of the most far-reaching e¤ects of
globalization is a weakening of the usual connection between an event and its geographical location.
j...j This weakening of the traditional ties between cultural experience and geographical location
brings new inuences and experiences into peoples everyday lives" (UNESCOWorld Report, 2009).
Think of any of the cultural goods mentioned before: from products of the audio-visual industry to
books, from restaurants to works of art. These goods can potentially be produced anywhere, but
they di¤er from each other depending on the culture that originated their content. Many books, for
example, can be considered unequivocally the products of a specic culture because, through the
main story, they give the reader a small taste of everyday life in the country the books narrative
is set. The book can tell something about that countrys habits, values, beliefs, socioeconomic
context and political situation. Everything, from the charactersnames to the relationship between
11 In Olivier et al. (2008) a cultural externality is dened in the following way: agents who share a common cultural
identity benet from a positive group externality when they engage in actions deemed appropriate by their culture
(as in Akerolf & Kranton, 2000), such as domestic cultural goods consumpion.
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parents and children, from the type of food people eat to the value they give to religion can be
very di¤erent between a story written by an Italian and one written by a Japanese author. At the
same time, though, this di¤erence has nothing to do with the place where the book is physically
printed and distributed. From the production point of view, indeed, the goods are identical as long
as they have the same physical characteristics (length, cover size, etc...). However, from the point
of view of the "consumer", i.e. the reader, they can be very di¤erent depending on their taste for
cultural heterogeneity and their ability to appreciate it. Similarly, in the model individuals are
homogeneous when considered as the unique production factor (i.e. labor), but when considered as
consumers they can di¤er between the two types described above.
The last crucial ingredient of the model is the idea that the xed cost of production of ethnic
cultural goods is decreasing in the number of people consuming the good: because of the specicity
of such goods, consumers need to learn to appreciate them (see Brito and Barros, 2005) thus an
important xed cost for producing these goods is likely to be represented by the costs to penetrate
the market. Self-reinforcing socio-psychological network e¤ects, however, will favour products which
have already become known in some way, due to what is called herding behavior, information
cascadesor bandwagons(see Choi et al., 1999).
In open economy, when trade is allowed, individuals will access a wider range of varieties at a
lower price, thus open minded individuals will be better o¤ both because of increased competition
and because of increased number of varieties. At the same time, di¤erently from the standard
Krugman framework, in the model presented in this paper the total number of varieties available
worldwide increases, capturing the idea that globalization generates new cultural forms through a
process of mixing and recomposing (Cowen 2002). The increase in the number of varieties produced/
consumed eases the integration costs of immigration for all individuals.12 This model thus proposes
also a non purely economic channel through which favorable attitudes towards immigration are
closely linked to trade-enhanced consumption of foreign cultural goods. Indeed, the presence of
a wider range of varieties reduces cultural distance among countries, leading to a more tolerant
12The idea that individual consumption of cultural goods has positive fallout on society as a whole, making the
latter more tolerant towards other ethnicities has already been recognized in economic literature. Pething and Cheng
(2000), for instance, propose a model where individual consumption of cultural goods can lead to accumulation of
cultural capital that is then appreciated by all members of the society.
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society.
This paper relates to the growing literature that analyses the specicities of cultural goods, and
how standard trade theory may not apply in the case of such type of goods. Ethnic (or cultural)
goods and services are dened as the products of those sectors that embody habits and values from a
specic culture/society, such as, for example: the art sector, the audiovisual industry (music, movies,
television programs) or the publishing sector (newspapers, books), the food industry (restaurants)
or education (language and culture schools). Cultural goods are special because consumers must
learn to appreciate them (see Brito and Barros, 2005) and network e¤ects are particularly important:
people prefer to consume what other people consume, because they want to be able to share social
experiences (see Choi et al., 1999). Janeba (2007) also identies cultural goods as network goods for
which consumption decisions of individuals are interdependent and their consumption is an input
to production of national identity. Contrary to the approach of this paper, though, in the existing
literature network e¤ects act only within cultures, leading trade integration to erode diversity.
Rauch and Trindade (2009) consider the consumption externalities approach in a model of the
home market e¤ect, arguing that "increased sharing of consumption network externalities across
countries exacerbates the home market e¤ect", reducing cultural diversity. Eckel (2006) denes a
framework where endogenous sunk costs and trade integration in horizontally di¤erentiated goods
can reduce diversity.
The paper draws also on recent contributions that discuss the link between cultural goods and
individual preferences over national identity on the one side and the evolution of cultural identity
on the other. Disdier et al. (2010a) analyze the importance of trade in cultural goods in overall
trade arguing that the specicity of this type of trade ows lies in its ability to impact values and
perceptions in the importing country. Disdier et al. (2010b) investigate how exposure to foreign
media a¤ects naming patterns in France, the latter being considered a proxy for national cultural
traditions. Olivier et al. (2008) study the dynamic evolution of cultural identity, showing that
trade in cultural goods can cause cultural divergence, but this e¤ect can be counterbalanced by
social integration. Maystre et al. (2008) build a model that links consumption and cultural identity.
Using data from the World Value Survey, they show that bilateral trade reduces cultural distance
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among countries, this e¤ect being stronger the more di¤erentiated the products considered.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 briey presents some stylized facts that
motivate the need for a specic approach to globalization and attitudes towards cultural identity in
Europe, section 3 introduces a simple theoretical framework that links cultural heterogeneity and
attitudes towards immigration, section 4 solves the model under autarky, section 5 discusses the
consequences of trade integration on cultural diversity and the welfare impact of immigration in
this context and section 6 concludes.
1.2 Attitudes towards cultural heterogeneity in Europe
A 2007 release of the Eurobarometer survey suggests that the majority of European citizens value
cultural heterogeneity and believe that globalization can preserve and enrich such cultural diver-
sity.13 Indeed 84.8% of respondents believe that "Cultural diversity is a value that is best embodied
in Europe". Moreover, most respondents are convinced that globalization can spread di¤erent cul-
tures around the world, preserving at the same time their specicities and richness: almost 70% of
respondents believe that "Through globalization, European culture will become more dynamics and
widespread in the world", but at the same time almost 60% disagree with the idea that "there is no
specic European culture, only a global western culture which is, for example, the same in Europe
and in the US". Finally, the survey hints to the idea that European citizens consider cross-cultural
exchanges as a promoter of tolerance and greater understanding: 92.7% of respondents believe that
"Culture and Cultural exchanges can play an important role in developing greater understanding
and tolerance in the world, even where there are conicts or tensions".
Despite the di¢ culties related to the coexistence of di¤erent cultural communities in European
societies, there seems to be a taste for diversity that characterizes the majority of European citizens.
This feature can be leveraged to promote a successful multicultural society. The idea that this
paper proposes is that one possible channel through which cultural heterogeneity can emerge is the
13The Eurobarometer is a survey, realized on behalf of the European commission, that regularly monitors the
"mood" of Europeans on di¤erent topics. The Eurobarometer 67.1 (2007) interviewed 27.746 citizens (aged 15 and
over) of the 25 countries in the European Union after the 2004 enlargement, in the remaining Accession Countries
Bulgaria and Romania and in Candidate Country Croatia.
17
production and consumption of cultural goods and that it is possible to leverage the love for variety
of open-minded individuals to enrich cultural diversity through globalization. Through cultural
exchanges and consumption patterns of open minded individuals it is also possible to build a more
tolerant society, reducing integration costs. Evidence of this e¤ect is proposed in the descriptive
analysis presented below, where I link 3 waves of the Eurobarometer survey on usage of foreign
languages14 with data on attitudes towards immigration from the European Social Survey (ESS)15 .
Indeed, the graphs that follow relate the share of the population consuming foreign cultural goods
in the previous year (x axis) to the share of the population having positive attitudes towards
immigration. Di¤erent shapes indicate di¤erent time periods. In particular, the Eurobarometer
survey asks whether the respondent uses regularly foreign languages 16 to read books, newspapers
or magazines (grouped as printed foreign media, see table 2), or to watch lms/television or to
listen to the radio (grouped as audio foreign media, see table 3).17 From the ESS, instead, it
is possible to retrieve data on the share of native population being favorable to immigrants of a
di¤erent race and ethnicity as the majority of population.18 On top of that, I also report data
on the share of population that believes immigrants enrich cultural life in host country.19 Finally,
for the last year only, data on the share of people that enjoy eating foreign cuisine are available
from the Eurobarometer (see Table 1). The descriptive evidence points to the fact that in countries
where there is a higher consumption of foreign cultural goods, there are also more positive attitudes
14 In particular I use the Eurobarometer 54 edition (2000) "Special Survey on Languages", the Eurobarometer 64.3
edition (2005)"Foreign Languages, Biotechnology, Organized Crime, and Health Items" and the Eurobarometer 67.1
(2007) edition on "Cultural Values, Poverty and Social Exclusion, Developmental Aid, and Residential Mobility".
15For both sample specic population and sample weights have been applied.
16The rst two foreign languages best known are considered. This sample includes both domestic and foreign
nationals living in each country, but the latter represent in all country less than 5% of the population, with the
exception of Luxembourg where they represent about 20% of the unweighted sample.
17The exact questions are: "When do you regularly use foreign language?" Respondent that chose the option
"whatching lms/television/listening radio" are considered consumers of audio foreign media, while those choosing
"reading books/newspapers/magazines" are considered consumers of audio foreign media. Regarding foreign cuisine,
the exact question is "Do you enjoy eating foreign cuisine?" and respondents answering yes are considered consumers
of foreign food. Data excludes foreign nationals when possible.
18The exact questions are "To what extent do you think [country] should allow people of a di¤ erent race or ethnic
group from most [country] people to come and live here?". Following the approach of Facchini & Mayda (2009), the
respondent is considered favourable to immigration if the answer to the respective question is either "allow many"
or "allow some" and non favourable if the answer is "allow few" or "allow none".
19The exact questions are: "Would you say that [country]s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by
people coming to live here from other countries?". The respondent is considered to appreciate the cultural enrichment
brought along by immigrants if the answer to the respective question is >5, on a scale In a scale ranging from 0 (
0=Cultural life undermined) and (10=Cultural life enriched)
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towards immigrants among the population, supporting the idea that consumption of ethnic cultural
goods can reduce the integration costs of immigration.
Table 1. Attitudes towards immigration and consumption of foreign cuisine (2008 only)
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Table 2. Attitudes towards immigration and consumption of printed foreign media
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Table 3. Attitudes towards immigration and consumption of audio foreign media
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1.3 The model
The simple theoretical framework that will be presented in this section is a two countries - three
sectors - one factor model. The basic idea of the model is that one possible channel through which
cultural heterogeneity can emerge in a society is the production and consumption of cultural goods.
In this perspective, it is possible to leverage the love for variety of open-minded individuals to enrich
cultural diversity through globalization and reduce the integration costs of immigration.
More precisely, consider a world where there exist 2 di¤erent countries indexed by z = 1; 2.
Each country originates a culture and consequently a population that shares that culture. In each
country there exist three sectors: two cultural goods sectors and an homogeneous good sector
characterized by perfect competition and constant returns to scale that can be considered as the
rest of the economy. The two cultural industries are: an untradable homogenous good sector (i.e.
local cultural good) that di¤ers from the rest of the economy (i.e., the non cultural homogeneous
good) precisely because it is not tradable and a (horizontally) di¤erentiated good sector (i.e. ethnic
cultural sector) that is characterized by monopolistic competition and increasing returns to scale.
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This last sector can be thought of as representing ethnic production, where each variety is dened on
the basis of the country of origin of the culture it represents.20 Each of the two sectors requires only
one production input: labor. Each individual owns one unit of labor that is fully supplied. Labor is
mobile across sectors. As already discussed in the introduction, individuals are homogeneous when
considered as workers, but, when considered as consumers, they can di¤er between "open-minded"
individuals Loand "closed-minded" individuals Lc.
More specically, both types of individuals consume both cultural and non cultural goods. At
the same time, though, while open minded individuals like not only the local cultural good but also
ethnic production, closed minded individuals consume only the local cultural good. Moreover, open
minded individuals give value to cross-cultural social exchange, while closed minded individuals
experience a positive cultural externality only when they match with people of their same culture
and type.
1.3.1 Consumerspreferences
The utility of individual k living in country z is dened as :
Ukz = q
H
k +[(1  )z + ]

qLk  
1
2
 
qLk
2
+
24 nzX
i=1
qik   1
2
nzX
i=1
q2ik  
1
2
 
nX
i=1
qik
!235 C( Immz
nz
)
(1)
where k = 1; :::; L indexes individuals and z = 1; :::M indexes countries. Moreover qHk is the
quantity consumed by individual k of the homogeneous good H, qLk is the quantity consumed by
individual k of the local cultural good and qik is the quantity consumed by individual k of the
single variety i of the di¤erentiated good. The quadratic terms are penalties and in particular:
  12
 
qLk
2
is a term that penalizes excessive consumption of the local cultural good,   12
X
q2ik is
a term that penalizes uneven distribution of consumption across varieties and   12
X
qik
2
is a
term that penalizes excessive consumption of the ethnic good. The rst and the last terms ensure
20More specically, thus, in this context ethnic production encompasses all cultural goods that originate from a
foreign culture.
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that income is never completely devoted to consumption of cultural goods and the intermediate
quadratic term introduce the love for variety feature that characterize preferences of open minded
individuals.
The parameter  distinguish individuals into their type: either open minded or closed minded.
In particular:
 =

= 1, if k >
_


= 0, if k <
_


where  is a latent variable indicating the individual propensity to cultural openness. Only if
the individual has a su¢ ciently strong propensity to cultural openness, he/she actually exit from the
"comfort zone" of its own culture and starts to approach foreign cultural goods. Such propensity to
cultural openness depends on the education level of individual k and on the propensity to cultural
openness of its parents: k = f(eduk; par;k): This assumption is in line with previous literature
that discusses the intergenerational transmission of preferences (see Olivier et al., 2008).
The parameter z embodies the so called cultural externality of closed-minded individuals.
The concept of cultural externality is dened in Olivier et al (2008): lets assume that agents derive
utility not only from individual consumption, but also from social exchange with other agents of
their same type and culture. Social exchange is dened as follows: within each country a matching
process takes place. At this stage, social exchange is possible only if two closed-minded individuals
that happen to match together share the same culture. For all individuals matching is random, thus
people match with certain probabilities xcz that depend on the number of closed-minded individuals
of each culture living in their country and on their distribution over space. In general,following
Olivier et al.(2008), if individual are homogeneously distributed within countries the probabilities
will be dened as follows: xz =
Lcz
Lz
, i.e. the percentage of closed minded individual in country z
over total population. Consequently, the cultural externality can be dened as
z =

1 +
Lcz
L
(SE   1)

(2)
where SE is the so called social exchange coe¢ cient (Olivier et al.,2008)
The parameter  denes, instead, the cultural externality of open-minded individuals. It di¤ers
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from z in a number of ways. First of all, in the case of open minded individuals social exchange
takes place only if they match with other open-minded individuals, regardless of their culture.
Also in this case the matching is random and thus open-minded people match with a certain
probabilities xoz that depend on the number of open-minded individuals present in the world and
on their distribution. In general, if individual are homogeneously distributed within countries, the
probability of any individual to match with an open minded individual will be dened as follows:
xoz =
Loz
Lz
. Consequently, the cultural externality in this case can be dened as
z =

1 +
Loz
Lz
(SE   1)

(3)
Moreover, the parameter  characterizes the taste for diversity of open-minded individuals,
as the higher is this parameter, the larger will be the preference for ethnic goods with respect
to other goods. Finally, the term C( Immzn ) represent the cost of integration of immigrants. It is
a positive function of the number of immigrants, while it decreases with the number of varieties
produced/consumed in the economy. The idea that the consumption of cultural goods is not only
benecial for the individual consumer but builds up a "cultural capital that renders the society
more civilized and which is enjoyed by all its members irrespective of (and in addition to) their own
cultural good consumption" has already been recognized in economic literature (see, Pethig and
Cheng, 2000, p.21). Here this idea is formalized assuming that integration costs decrease for both
types of individuals with the increase in the number of cultural goodsvarieties produced/consumed
in the economy.21
Each individual will thus maximize utility (1) under a classical budget constraint of the form
pHqHk + p
LqLk +
nX
i=1
piqik = Ik (4)
where
 pH is the price of the homogeneous non cultural good
21The latter depends on the demand for such goods which derives from open minded individuals.
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 pL is the price of the local cultural good
 pi is the price of variety i of the ethnic cultural good
 Ik is the income of an individual k, that depends on labor income only and thus equals
individual wage w. Note, indeed, that each worker supplies 1 unit of labour.
1.3.2 Production technology
Both the homogeneous non cultural good and the homogeneous cultural good are produced in a
perfectly competitive sector with a production technology that exhibits constant returns to scale.
As for the di¤erentiated good sector, it is characterized by monopolistic competition and tech-
nology exhibiting increasing returns to scale as in Krugman (1980). Firms are perfectly symmetric
and technology is described by the following total cost equation: TCiz = (f + bqi)w, with 0 < b < 1
being the variable cost and f > 0 being the xed cost of production. The presence of these 2 addi-
tional cost components in the production of ethnic cultural goods, that di¤erentiate the technology
of this sector from the identity function dening local goodstotal cost function captures the idea
that ethnic production face higher costs than local cultural sector. Such costs are due mainly to the
di¢ culty of "creating" a consumer base for products that are not well known in the host country
since they belong to a di¤erent culture (i.e. marketing cost). In this perspective, the di¤erence
introduced here with respect to previous new economic geography models, lies in the fact that xed
costs of production, f , depends directly on the client base of the rm, i.e. f = F=Lo;z. F > 0 is the
total xed cost that the rm would face if it bore the whole cost of creating a consumer base for
its products because only one person consumed its goods in the population. The assumption that
xed cost of production is devreasing in the number of consumers is grounded in cultural goods
theory (see Choi et al. 1999), which denes cultural goods as credence goods, for which quality
is rarely learned before consumption and "becomes dependent on what other people think". Thus
xed costs of production will mainly represent the investments that rms producing ethnic goods
face to penetrate the market. These costs decrease in the number of actual consumers, a phenom-
enon depending on the idea that "socio-psychological network e¤ects are self-enforcing, favouring
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products which have already become known in some way" (see Choi et al. 1999, p. S63).
1.4 Equilibrium in closed economy
1.4.1 Demand side of the economy
Maximizing (1) under (4) we can nd the optimal demand of each good for each type of consumer
(see the mathematical appendix for a detailed derivation of the results). In particular, individuals
demand for the local cultural good depends entirely on the respective cultural externality:

qLo;z =
z 1
z
qLc;z =
z 1
z
The stronger each types cultural externality, the higher is the consumption of local cultural
goods, a result in line with previous literature22 . Open minded individuals consume also the ethnic
cultural goods, more specically their demand function is:
qi;z =
1
z
2664 z + nz +
nzP
j=1
pj;z
 + nz
  pi
3775
which is decreasing in the cultural externality,23 but it is increasing in the love for diversity of
open-minded consumers ().
Finally, the demand for the non cultural good of each type of consumers is dened as a residual
after consumption choices of the other two goods are made (see the appendix):
qHo;z = 1z   nzP
i=1
qipi
qHc;z =
1
z
Welfare of each type of individual can thus be evaluated using the indirect utility function
associated with the utility function described in equation (1), i.e.:
22Note that the demand functions presented in this section already incorporate the result pH = pL = 1. This
simplication is derived in the following section and in the mathematical appendix.
23This negative e¤ect depends on the fact z increases also the consumption of the local cultural good.
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The welfare of open minded consumers rises with the increase of the cultural externality, as the
latter enhances welfare gains from consumption of cultural goods, and with the increase in their
love for diversity, as well as with the rise in the number of varieties available, while it decreases if
the price level increases and if the integration cost increases. Welfare of closed minded individuals
entirely depends on their cultural externality and on the integration cost.
1.4.2 Supply side of the economy
As a result of perfect competition and constant returns to scale technology,24 prot maximizing
rms in homogeneous sectors face a market price that equals their marginal cost.25 The latter
coincides with wages given that labor is the only production input: pH = MC = w. Taking the
price of the homogeneous cultural good as the numeraire pH = w = 1. Analogously also pL = 1:
Prot maximization in the case of di¤erentiated goods sector involves equating marginal revenue
and marginal cost, thus leading to the following optimal price for any di¤erentiated variety:
pz =
b( + nz) + z
2 + nz
(7)
Optimal total demand for the di¤erentiated good is:
QDz =
Lo(z   b)
(2 + nz)
As in Krugman(1980), exploiting the free entry condition, prots must equal zero, thus the
24Firms in these sectors face an identity production function, see the appendix for more details.
25As long as they produce.
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optimal quantity produced is:
QSz =
F (2 + nz)
Loz(z   b)
(8)
The balance of demand and supply instead denes the number of varieties produced in equilibrium
in each country:
nz = 

Loz (z   b)p
F
  2

(9)
substituting (9) in (7) it is possible to obtain the price level of each variety and the equilibrium
quantity of the di¤erentiated good:
pz = b+ pFzLoz
Qz =
q
F
z
Note that the number of varieties produced in a country is thus increasing in the consumer base
(Loz), as this allows to lower the burden of xed costs, and in both the cross-cultural externality
and the love for diversity coe¢ cient. Note also that the direct e¤ect of the cultural externality is
positive both on the demand and on the price level. This is because an increase in z rises the
elasticity of demand. However, this direct e¤ect is reversed by its indirect e¤ect acting through the
number of varieties, thus the net e¤ect of z on Qz is negative. The result is such that while the
love for diversity e¤ect (parameter ) a¤ects only the number of varieties of the di¤erentiated good
produced in the economy, the externality causes the demand to become more rigid and increases
the number of varieties.
As far as homogeneous goods are concerned, price equals 1 as it is taken as numeraire. The
equilibrium total quantity produced of each good is instead:
 QL = Loz z 1z + Lcz z 1z
QH =
Loz
z
+
Lcz
z
  (
p
Fz+Loz)[Loz(z b) 2
p
Fz]
zLoz
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As already noted, the total quantity of the local cultural good positively depends on the cultural
externality for both types of individuals, while the equilibrium quantity of the homogeneous non
cultural good is determined as a residual after taking into account the optimal consumption choices
of the other 2 goods.
1.5 Equilibrium in open economy
The extension of this closed economy model to the case of 2 countries perfectly integrated through
trade is straightforward. Free trade correspond to an increase in market size for rms that conse-
quently leads to an increase in the number of varieties available in each country. This e¤ect cause a
decrease in price, while the equilibrium quantity of each variety now depends on xed costs and on
the interplay between the externality and the size of the open minded population in each country:
pFT = b+
r
F
LoW

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1
+ Lo22

LoW  

Lo1
1
+ Lo22

b
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s
F
LoW

Lo1
1
+
Lo2
2

The increase in the number of varieties and the decrease in their price leads to a welfare im-
provement for open minded individuals, which are the only consumers of ethnic goods. Indeed, the
number of varieties produced under free trade is:
nFT = 
8<:
s
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F

Lo1
1
+
Lo2
2
 1 
LoW  

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1
+
Lo2
2

b

  2
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Having said that, the interesting point in this model is that under free trade consumers enjoy
a larger number of varieties of the not only because of their increased availability in each country,
but also because the total number of varieties produced worldwide increases. Indeed, comparing
nFT and nA;as dened in equation (9), it is possible to notice that nFT is higher than nA :
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The number of varieties under free trade increases with the intensity of love for diversity of open
minded individuals because the burden of xed cost of production of ethnic goods decreases more
than proportionally with the consumer base. Indeed, when the number of consumers increases,
the xed cost of production for each rm is spread on a larger base. At the same time, such cost
decreases also because of " information cascades", an e¤ect that derive form cultural goods being
"credence goods", as discussed in section 1.3.2. This result indicates that trade integration can
increase cultural diversity, leveraging the preference for diversity in consumption of foreign cultural
goods that characterize open minded individuals. The idea is that globalization can generate new
cultural forms and this will have a backlash on the welfare impact of immigrants in a country.
Starting from this result and although the number of immigrants in this model is exogenously
given, through a comparative static exercise it is possible to gain some intuition on the impact
of di¤erences in the number of immigrants on individuals welfare. Note that immigrantsimpact
on peoples welfare in this model depends on their impact on the cultural externality and on the
integration cost.
In particular, as far as open minded individuals are concerned, the impact of immigrants on
welfare depends on their cultural externality, which increases in the number of open minded im-
migrants present in the society, and on the integration cost, which decreases with the number of
varieties produced. Indeed, from 5:
@Vo;z
@ Immz
=

2
@z
@ Imm
  1
n
@Cz
@ Immz
(10)
where  =
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1  1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+ n(z p)z
i
;which is positive as long as the number
of varieties n is greater than 1.
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As far as closed minded individuals are concerned, instead, the impact of immigrants on welfare
is always negative or zero as it depends only on the integrations costs. Indeed, from (6):
@Vc;z
@ Immz
=   1
n
@Cz
@ Immz
This result derives from the fact that, while open minded individuals value cross-cultural social
exchange, closed minded individuals benet of social exchange only from other closed minded people
of their same culture.
The higher the number of varieties available in an economy, thus, the lower the integration cost
and the higher the positive impact of immigrants on social welfare.
Thus trade, while increasing the diversity in ethnic production, can foster positive attitudes
towards immigrants. This e¤ect captures the idea that the creation of new varieties stemming from
mixture of existing cultures shorten cultural distance among them, easing integration costs of im-
migration for all individuals. This model thus proposes also a non purely economic channel through
which favorable attitudes towards immigration are closely linked to trade enhanced consumption of
foreign cultural goods. Indeed, the presence of a wider range of varieties reduces cultural distance
among countries, leading to a more tolerant society.
1.6 Conclusions
From an individual perspective, this paper suggests that some of our economic choices and actions
as consumers can inuence our broad understanding of the society we live in. From a social
perspective, this paper o¤ers a theoretical framework to analyze the potential welfare increasing
e¤ects of cultural globalization. As this last aspects of world integration is getting more and more
attention in the political debate, protectionist attitudes both towards trade and immigration are
rising. Starting from the idea, increasingly well-established in the literature on culture and trade,
that foreign cultural goods can transform domestic tastes, this paper argues that multiculturalism
can succeed without necessarily reducing diversity in the integration process. This is possible only if
multicultural societies cultivate a new kind of identity that transcends geographical borders and is
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grounded on openness towards di¤erent cultures and love for diversity. Indeed, leveraging the taste
for diversity in consumption of foreign cultural goods that characterize open minded individuals,
globalization can increase cultural diversity and foster positive attitudes towards immigrants and
the cultural enrichment they brought along. Indeed, once an economy opens up to free trade in
cultural goods, the number of varieties available worldwide increases: mixing and matching among
cultures creates new intermediate varieties that shorten the cultural distance among local ones. At
the level of the society, this e¤ect can increase welfare gains from cross cultural social exchange
and lower integration costs, enhancing social welfare and fostering overall pro-immigrant attitudes
in the population.
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1.7 Appendix
1.7.1 Closed economy
Consumersmaximization problem Starting from 1, consider that in the case of open-minded
individuals  = 1. In this case, note that 1 can be rewritten as:
Ukz = q
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Thus, in each country open minded individualsmaximization problem in closed economy with
ethnic sector leads to the following Lagrangian:
L = qHk +z
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from which to derive to the following FOCs:
1. @L
@qHk
= 1  pH = 0 Normalizing pH = 1 (numeraire) this condition leads to  = 1.
2. @L
@qLk
= z   zqLk   pL = 0 . Substituting  = 1 and rearranging: 1  qLk = p
L
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;and thus
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thus
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qik   pi = 0. Substituting  = 1 and rearranging
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z   zqik   z
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applying summation operator to both sides of the equation:
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substituting 14 into 13 it is possible to write:
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Multiplying individual open minded individualsconsumption of each ethnic variety by the total
number of open minded individuals living in country z, we can obtain aggregate demand for each
ethnic variety in country z.
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Starting from 1, consider now the case of closed-minded individuals, i.e.  = 0. In this case,
note that 1 can be rewritten as:
Ukz = q
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Thus, in each country closed minded individualsmaximization problem in closed economy leads
to the following Lagrangian:
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from which to derive to the following FOCs:
1. @L
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= 1  pH = 0 Normalizing pH = 1 (numeraire) this condition leads to  = 1.
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The total demand of the homogeneous good in each country is QHz = Q
oH
z +Q
cH
z M , thus:
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the total demand for the local cultural good is QLz = Q
oL
z +Q
cL
z , thus:
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while the total demand of the di¤erentiated good in each country will equal only the total
demand of open minded individuals as they are the only ones that consume di¤erentiated goods.
Firmsmaximization problem Lets consider rst the homogeneous good sector. The latter
is characterized by perfect competition and constant returns to scale, with labor as the unique
production factor. Technology will be thus described by a simple total cost function of the form:
TCH = wQH . In the optimum price will equal marginal cost thus: MCH = w = pH (= 1 by
normalization)
Thus wages are dened by this same normalization as w = 1. Now consider local cultural good
production: also this sector is characterized by perfect competition and constant returns to scale,
with labor as unique production factor, thus also in this case MCL = w = pL = 1.
As far as the di¤erentiated good sector is concerned, instead, we follow the seminal work by
Krugman (1980). This sector is characterized by perfect competition and increasing returns to
scale. Each rm produces 1 variety and all rms are perfectly symmetric with technology of the
form: TCH = (f + bQi)w: As already discussed, the only novelty introduced here regards xed
costs, which are a decreasing function of consumerssize: f = FLoz
Prot maximization leads to equate marginal revenues with marginal costs, i.e. MR=MC ,
pi +
@pi
@Qiz
Qiz = bw
From 16 and assuming that a single rm is too small to inuence the price of other rms:
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@Qiz
=
h
Loz
z
i 1
; moreover w = 1 thus:
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the system of nz symmetric equations in nz unknown given by 26 has a unique solution. Given
that rms are all symmetric in equilibrium pi = pj = ::: = p and thus:
pz =
b ( + nz) + z
2 + nz
(27)
Free entry condition drives prot to zero, thus Qs(p   b) + f = 0 or Qs(p   b) + FLoz = 0, thus
substituting 27 in this equation:
Qsz =
F (2 + nz)
Loz (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(28)
Substituting 27 into 16:
QDz =
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Loz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(29)
Equilibrium of demand and supply in each market requires 28 to equal29 and this denes the
number of varieties produced in each country:
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1.7.2 Open Economy
Equilibrium in a world of 2 countries where the homogeneous non cultural good and ethnic produc-
tion are traded with no frictions (the local cultural good is non tradable by assumption) is derived
using the same procedure as in closed economy. The only di¤erence is that rms operating in the
di¤erentiated goods sector now face world demand dened as QDW = Q
D
1 +Q
D
2 , thus
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that after a few manipulations reduces to
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Following Bjorvatn and Cappelen (2003), the last crucial ingredient of the model is the assump-
tion that di¤erences in the social environment where people grow up a¤ect their preferences and the
latter in turn a¤ect their adult economic decisions. In particular, the selection of individuals into
open-minded or closed-minded consumers and their love for diversity is assumed to be dened during
childhood,i.e. the formative period of peoples life, and to depend on their education and the cul-
tural environment they experienced. This assumption is grounded in sociological and psychological
research: for example, Brown and Johnson (1971, p.311) nd that children with no close contacts
with immigrants tend to rely on stereotypes derived from hearsay, or from atypical situations. Such
stereotyping, and its associated prejudices, is diminished by close contact with immigrants, since
there is then an opportunity to form evaluative judgements which are truly representative of the
racial group.
1.7.3 Welfare analysis
Substituting 12, 15 and 17 into 11 we get the indirect utility function for open minded individuals
as a function of their cultural externality, their love for varieties, the integration cost, the price level
and the number of varieties to which they have access to:
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Note that this is an increasing function of . Moreover this is an increasing function of z as
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and this expression is positive as long as the number of varieties is greater than 1.
Welfare is also an increasing function of n as
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which is positive as long as  > p and this is always true if n > 0
Finally welfare is a decreasing function of the price level, indeed:
@Vo;z
@p =   +n n 
which is negative as long as n > .
Lets now consider the welfare impact of immigration. A marginal increase in the number of
immigrants a¤ects welfare of open minded individuals through the eventual change in the externality
e¤ect, if immigrants are open minded as well, and through the impact on the integration cost, which
is assumed to be an increasing function of the number of immigrants:
@Vo;z
@ Immz
= 12
@z
@ Immz
n
1 + 12z
+ [n(z+p) 2]2z
 
1 + n
 1
+ (z p)nz
o
  1n @Cz@ Immz
dene  =
h
1  12z +
 
1 + n
 1 [n(z+p) 2]p
2z
+ n(z p)z
i
and note that  > 0 as long as the number of varieties is greater than 1.
Welfare of closed minded individuals is instead dened as:
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2 Exposure to foreign cultural goods and peoples attitudes
towards migration
This paper proposes and empirical analysis of the role that cultural factors have in shaping peo-
ples attitudes towards immigration. More specically, I introduce the idea that a possible channel
through which cultural heterogeneity can emerge in a society is the production and the consump-
tion of cultural goods and I analyse the impact that patterns of consumption of di¤erent cultural
goods can have on public opinion over immigration. The paper provides empirical evidence on the
possibility that, controlling for potential endogeneity, enhanced exposure to cultural heterogeneity
positively a¤ects attitudes towards immigration. In doing so, it joins data on individual attitudes
from four rounds of the European Social Survey and data on trade ows from UN-Comtrade data-
base.
2.1 Introduction
How should European countries manage immigration? Which policies need to be adopted to handle
the phenomenon? These two questions are among the most debated issues on todays political
agenda. Aside from purely economic considerations, a growing attention is paid to issues such as
national identity and culture. Recent statements by the German chancellor Angela Merkel about the
death of multiculturalism have put integration strategies at the forefront of the political debate over
immigration. The German leader pointed out that it had been an illusion to think that Germans
and foreign workers could "live happily side by side". Similarly in the UK, considered a symbol of
liberalism, a debate over national identity is starting and "compared with a decade ago, the laissez-
faire approach to immigration has fewer takers, even on the left." In fact, "unequivocal defenders
of multiculturalism are now hard to nd; even its advocates concede the need for newcomers to
learn to speak English, and, to a degree, for values and institutions to bind together a diverse
population." (The Economist, Apr 29th 2010). Many European political leaders thus argue the
failure of multiculturalism, but few of them are making further e¤ort to elaborate on the nature
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and causes of this failure. As Mr Cameron recently said at a conference in Munich, "the doctrine
of state multiculturalism had encouraged Britons to live segregated lives. In its stead, he proposed
a muscular liberalism that confronts extremism and promotes a British identity open to all" (The
Economist, Feb 10th 2011). Multiculturalism is something that needs to be built and cannot
simply happen. An ideal homogeneous society needs not to be supported to prosper peacefully,
while cohabitation of di¤erent cultures in the same society needs reciprocal understanding in order
to avoid social tensions. What if the failure of multiculturalism is just a matter of lack of mutual
comprehension? What if the biggest obstacle is the lack of means through which di¤erent cultures
can dialogue among each others?
Along with this heated political debate, the scientic literature has suggested the idea that
cultural diversity in a society can inuence in a number di¤erent ways both peoples attitudes
towards immigration and peoples propensity to migrate. Pritchett (2006) points out that of all
ideas that limit migration, perhaps the most important is the idea that there is a national culture
and that increased labor mobility threatens that culture.
Ethnic heterogeneity in economics is usually associated with positive e¤ects on the supply side
and negative e¤ects on the demand side of the economy. The former are usually associated with
enhanced productivity while the latter to welfare losses. Alesina and La Ferrara(2005), for example,
consider a model where individual utility depends on the consumption of a public good (i.e. schools,
roads, ecc.): high fragmentation of the society in ethnic groups causes conict of preferences. On the
production side, skills of di¤erent individuals are complementary in the production of a private good
and thus the presence of a larger number of ethnic groups enhances productivity26 . Ottaviano and
Peri (2006) consider that cultural diversity could have an e¤ect on agentsutility, acting as a local
disamenity in so far as multiculturalism may endanger natives own cultural values, or it could
have a productivity e¤ect associated with local diversity that depends on the interplay between
intercultural frictions and complementarities. Kerr and Lincoln (2010) link directly high-skilled
immigration and technology formation in US between 1995 and 2007: they show that increased
admissions of highly skilled workers in US cities raised the total number of innovations and this
26At a rate that decreases with the number of individualstypes available.
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happened mainly thanks to the contribution of immigrant inventors.
However, growing empirical evidence highlights the role played by a third channel through
which peoples attitudes towards immigration can be shaped: cultural factors. Nevertheless, there
is no clear discussion about the direction of the e¤ect of enhanced cultural heterogeneity on those
attitudes.
This paper contributes to the existing literature by introducing the idea that one possible channel
through which cultural heterogeneity can emerge in a society is the production and the consumption
of cultural goods. In particular, it discusses the role of an economic channel linking favorable
attitudes towards immigration and consumption of foreign cultural goods. The empirical analysis
that follows shows that "active" exposure to foreign cultural goods27 can signicantly increase
the probability of being pro-immigration. This analysis is based on data from the European Social
Survey on individual attitudes towards immigration and data from UN-Comtrade on cultural goods
imports. Results show that controlling for individual relevant characteristics and country level
unobserved heterogeneity, exposure to higher cultural diversity increases peoples tolerance towards
immigration. This e¤ect is stronger when considering immigrants of a di¤erent race/ethnicity and
is shown to depend on immigrantsability to enrich cultural life in their host country. Results are
robust to more disaggregated regional controls and to endogeneity
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 briey reviews the existing literature
on the link between immigration and culture, section 3 presents the empirical analysis on cultural
heterogeneity and attitudes toward immigration, section 4 discusses some robustness checks and
section 5 concludes.
2.2 Literature review
This paper introduces the idea that one possible channel through which cultural heterogeneity can
emerge in a society is the consumption of cultural goods and that it is possible to leverage such
27By using the expression "active" exposure to foreign cultural goods I want to underline the importance of
considering the actual individual specic exposure to foreign cultural goods that may reach a country. In particular
I consider the e¤ect mediated by education, following the econometric strategy proposed by Facchini and Mayda
(2009).
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channel to increase positive attitudes towards immigration and the multiculturalism immigrants
brought along. In doing so I draw on di¤erent strands of literature.
First of all this paper builds on the debate over cost and benets of increased immigration.
Traditionally the economic impact of immigration is discussed in terms of labor market outcomes,
as immigrants change the skill composition of the labor force, or in terms of welfare burden. As far
as the labor market impact of immigration is concerned a wide literature has distinguished di¤erent
channels through which host economies can adjust to immigration. Indeed, immigration inows
can change wage and employment levels or they can cause an adjustment in the output mix of host
economy and in production technologies adopted (see Dustmann et al., 2008, for a review of existing
literature). As far as the public nance impact of immigration is concerned, instead, the channels
usually considered are mainly two: the impact of immigration on tax burden or its consequences on
benet adjustment. Empirical results in this regards are mixed and often depend on the country
considered (see for example Borjas et al., 1996, and Borjas , 1999, for United States and Boeri et
al. 2002 for the case of European Union member states). Considering more closely the e¤ect of
welfare-state considerations on individual attitudes towards migration, Facchini and Mayda (2009)
support the idea that adjustment to immigration is realized through changes in tax rate. More
specically , they control for labor market determinants and other individual characteristics and
they show in a cross-country analysis that high income individuals oppose unskilled immigration
while favoring skilled one.
Secondly, this paper is mainly based on the literature that discusses the socio-economic impact
of ethnic heterogeneity. As already discussed in the introduction, ethnic heterogeneity is usually
associated with positive e¤ects on the supply side and negative e¤ects on the demand side of the
economy (See Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005; Ottaviano and Peri, 2006)
An other important strand of literature this paper draws on is the discussion over the role of
cultural factors in driving perceived costs and benets associated with increased immigration and in
shaping attitudes towards immigrants. A growing empirical literature, indeed, tries to distinguish
the economic factors just described from non-economic determinants of attitudes towards immigra-
tion: all these contributions, controlling for labor market and welfare concerns, introduce an impor-
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tant role for cultural factors, values and beliefs in shaping attitudes towards immigrants. Citrin,
Green, Muste and Wong (1995) use US data to provide evidence that, conditioning on noneconomic
factors, the correlation between attitudes towards immigration and economic characteristics is much
weaker. Dustmann and Preston (2007) show for UK that preference for tight immigration policy is
more strongly associated with racial prejudice than job insecurity or tax concerns when considering
immigrants of di¤erent ethnicity from the majority. In a more recent paper (Card et al., 2009),
they also broaden those results developing a reduced form model in which consumers distinguish
between economic e¤ect of immigration on the one side and "compositional amenities" e¤ect on
the other. In particular they identify these latter with characteristics of the society the individual
lives in: preferred degree of homogeneity in customs, traditions, religion and language spoken, as Ill
as perceived impact of immigrants on cultural life, social tensions and crime. Using answers to 10
questions from the European Social Survey (ESS), they identify the relative importance of the two
channels described above in shaping individual preferences over immigration policy and they show
that cultural e¤ects are far more signicant than economic e¤ects in driving individual concerns
over immigration. Bisin, Patacchini et al. (2010) discuss the idea that immigrations perceived
impact is not only associated to an economic cost and benet analysis, but also to cultural diversity
and to the degree of integration of immigrants in host societies (civic identity, segregation along
both economic and geographical lines and labor market outcomes). Moreover, a number of recent
contributions, concentrate specically on the crucial role of cultural considerations over national
identity and integration costs in assessing the impact of immigration, dening individual attitudes
and consequently shaping immigration policies. Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007), for instance, show
that the e¤ect of education on individual attitudes towards immigration depends on its link to anti-
racist inclinations and preferences for cultural diversity. Facchini et al. (2009) consider US citizens
in 2006 and, controlling for possible endogeneity and individual specic characteristics, they show
that media exposure a¤ects signicantly public opinion on illegal immigration. Jain and Mukand
(2010) propose a model that introduces the role of cultural factors in driving migration policy. The
idea they start from is that "what is distinctive about the politics of migration is that in popular
perception it has the potential to a¤ect a countrys culture and identity." They build a dynamic
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political economy model where countries di¤er in their ability to culturally assimilate migrants.
Countries with poor cultural assimilation will take advantage of short term foreign workers pro-
grams while more culturally diverse and tolerant countries will rely more on permanent migration.
Interestingly, in the models framework migration policy crucially depends on individual attitudes
towards cultural heterogeneity.
Moreover, this paper is based on the literature linking cultural goods and individual preferences
on the one hand and immigration inows and diversity of production on the other. Ethnic (or
cultural) goods and services are dened as the products of those sectors that embody habits and
values from a specic culture/society, such as, for example: the art sector, the audiovisual industry
(music, movies, television programs) or the publishing sector (newspapers, books), the food industry
(restaurants) or education (language and culture schools).28 Janeba (2007) identies cultural goods
as network goods for which consumption decisions of individuals are interdependent and their
consumption is an input to production of national identity. Disdier et al. (2010a) analyze the
importance of trade in cultural goods in overall trade arguing that the specicity of this type
of trade ows lies in its ability to impact values and perceptions in the importing country. The
existence of a link between cultural goods and individual preferences on the one side and between
immigration inows and diversity of production on the other side is also supported by two recent
papers. The rst is a contribution by Disdier et al. (2010b) that investigate whether exposure
to foreign media a¤ects naming patterns as a proxy national cultural traditions. The second is a
paper by Mazzolari and Neumark (2010) that studies the e¤ect of immigration on the diversity of
consumption choices.
This paper draws form and links all these di¤erent strands of literature. Its novelty lies in
the introduction of a di¤erent perspective to look at non purely economic determinants of indi-
vidualsattitudes towards immigrants, analyzing the possibility that one channel through which
cultural heterogeneity can emerge is the production and the consumption of cultural goods and
that enhanced cultural heterogeneity may positively a¤ect attitudes towards immigrants. Indeed,
28See UNESCO (2009) denition of cultural goods as "Consumer goods that convey ideas, symbols and ways of
life, i.e. books, magazines, multimeda products, software, recordings, lms, videos, audio-visual programmes, crafts
and fashion".
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the consumption of cultural goods is likely to represent one of the so much needed bridges between
di¤erent cultures because it could a¤ect peoples attitudes towards immigrants.
2.3 Empirical analysis
The aim of my analysis is to discuss whether the patterns of consumption of cultural goods can
enhance reciprocal understanding and favour coexistence of di¤erent cultures in the same society,
i.e. the much debated multiculturalism that politicians claim to be dead.
To inspect the potential of cultural goods and investigate the role of this channel in shaping
attitudes towards immigrants in European countries, I link data on individualsattitudes toward
migration to trade ows data regarding some specic categories of goods identied in existing
literature as "cultural goods" (see for example Mayer et al., 2010), based on UNESCO (2009) clas-
sication. More specically, I consider data from 4 waves of the European Social Survey (ESS):
2002, 2004, 2006, 2008. The resulting pooled sample includes overall individuals born in 32 Euro-
pean countries29 . Aside from a number of individual-specic characteristics, the survey provides
individual answers to two questions which are relevant for the analysis that follows:
1. "To what extent do you think [country] should allow people of the same race or ethnic group
as most [country] people to come and live here?"
2. "How about people of a di¤erent race or ethnic group from most [country] people?"
Following the approach of Facchini and Mayda (2009), on the basis of answers to these questions
I build two dummy variables dened as follows:
 pro_immig1 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the answer to question 1 is either "allow
many" or "allow some" and 0 otherwise30
29The countries considered are: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Switzerland, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Germany, Spain, Finland, France, Greece, Croatia, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg,
Netherland, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Sweden, Slovenia, Slovakia, Turkey, Ukraine
and United Kingdom
30 i.e. pro_immig 1=0 if the answer is either "allow few" or "allow none" and the same criterion applies to
pro_immig2
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 pro_immig2 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the answer to question 2 is either "allow
many" or "allow some" and 0 otherwise
I use those two variables as dependent variables in the analysis that follows and they repre-
sent a measure of attitudes towards immigrants in the specic context of this paper. Moreover,
I restrict the sample to natives only, excluding from the analysis immigrants of rst and second
generation31 . Following previous literature on attitudes towards immigration (ORourke and Sin-
nott, 2006; Mayda, 2006; Facchini and Mayda, 2009), a number of individual specic characteristics
and controls are included in the regressions, considering in particular demographic and economic
variables for each respondent. First of all I considered the age of the respondent, on the basis of the
idea that on average the older a person is, the more adverse to immigration it is likely to be. I also
consider some demographic controls such as a dummy that equals 1 if the respondent is married
and 0 otherwise, a dummy that equals 1 if she/he has children and 0 otherwise and one indicating
gender. For these controls I do not have a prior, but it may be important to include them in order
to take into account possible systematic di¤erences for the various groups of individuals. As for the
economic variables, I consider the income of the household the individual belongs to and a dummy
that equals 1 if the respondent is unemployed (actively looking for a job) and 0 otherwise. On the
basis of existing literature, as discussed in section 2, I expect that individuals with higher income
are more pro-immigration and those unemployed, instead, oppose immigrants. Finally, I include a
variable that indicates political preferences of the respondent on a left-right scale, where 0 means
the left and 10 means the right. What I expect, considering also the results of existing literature, is
that the higher this variable, the higher the adversion towards immigration since right parties are
usually associated to more conservative policies. Country-year xed e¤ects are also included.
I merge data from the ESS with an "index of variety of foreign cultural goods" built as an
extensive margin of imports of cultural goods. In particular, I use data from UN-Comtrade database
to build an index dened as the mean number of trading partners from which the country of interest
imported at least one of the cultural goods considered over the 3 years preceding the interview32 .
31 Indeed, note that we focus our analysis on the sample of people that are born in the country of interest and
whose parents are both natives of that country.
32Averaging over 3 years we want to mitigate the e¤ect of possible time-specic shocks.
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In particular, the following sectors have been identied: HS-9706 (Antiques of an age exceeding one
hundred years), HS-37069 (Cinematographic lm, exposed and developed), HS-4902 (Newspapers,
journals and periodicals) and HS-490199 (Printed reading books, excluding dictionaries).
From the descriptive statistics reported in table 1a, note that the pooled sample is overall com-
posed by over 150 thousand individuals living in 32 di¤erent countries. The majority of individuals
are favorable to immigrants of the same race/ethnicity as the majority of the population but oppose
immigration of di¤erent races/ethnicities. Moreover, about half of the public opinion believes that
immigrants enrich the cultural life of the hosting country, but the larger part believes that they
make the quality of life lower. Most individuals included in the sample are married but without
children and almost all of them are employed or outside the labor force. Note that females are
slightly more represented than males.
Table 1a:Descriptive statistics
pro_immig same ethnicity 155044 0.61 0.49 0 1
pro_immig different ethnicity 155044 0.46 0.50 0 1
pro_immig cultural enrichment 155044 0.50 0.50 0 1
pro_immig welfare increase 155044 0.33 0.47 0 1
married 155044 0.53 0.50 0 1
child 155044 0.39 0.49 0 1
unemployed 155044 0.04 0.19 0 1
female 155044 0.54 0.50 0 1
age 154294 47.12 18.58 13 123
income 109379 5.87 2.70 1 12
left-right scale 132424 5.16 2.20 0 10
education (years) 153321 11.74 4.08 0 34
city 155044 0.31 0.46 0 1
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
The average individual belonging to the sample is middle-aged and it has completed about 12
years of education. Considering more closely the case of education however, there is a large variation
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among individuals considered: there are, indeed, some individuals that completed more than 30
years of education.33
Table 1b:Number of trading partners by country-year
AT 78 97 95 . 90
BE 72 78 81 84 79
BG . . 48 55 52
CH 112 114 124 133 120
CY . . 51 53 52
CZ 70 73 . 79 74
DE 77 101 115 111 100
DK 112 120 125 124 120
EE . 52 55 52 53
ES 83 102 117 133 111
FI 58 63 68 86 69
FR 126 125 125 122 124
GB 135 136 136 141 137
GR 61 56 . 62 60
HR . . . 62 62
HU 51 56 56 52 54
IE 78 85 97 . 86
IL 64 . . 71 67
IS . 57 . . 57
LU 51 57 . . 54
LV . . . 50 50
NL 93 94 93 100 95
NO 76 78 86 97 83
PL 37 35 71 88 56
PT 79 83 77 77 79
RO . . . 68 68
RU . . 72 74 73
SE 115 128 124 116 121
SI 58 66 66 63 63
SK . 66 65 62 64
TR . 47 . 60 55
UA . 45 47 50 47
Total 80 81 89 84 84
Country 2002 2004 2006 2008 Total
As far as the trade indices are considered (see table 1b above), rst of all note that cultural goods
are characterized by a large number of importing countries. This rst evidence already suggest the
importance of the origin country for these latter. In particular, on average countries import from
80/90 di¤erent partners with a peak of 141 in the case of United Kingdom in 2008. Note that this
33The latter belong mainly to The Netherlads, Germany or United Kingdom.
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trade index, which varies at country/year level only, has been interacted with the level of education
of the individuals to obtain a proxy for the individual-level "active exposure" to foreign cultural
goods. By using the expression "active exposure", indeed, I want to underline the importance of
considering the individual specic ability enjoy foreign cultural goods that may reach a country.
All cultural goods considered, indeed, require a signicant level of cultural literacy and interest in
order to be appreciated. For this reason the analysis focuses on the e¤ect of imports mediated by
years of education of each individual, following the econometric strategy proposed by Facchini and
Mayda (2009). Moreover, I believe that a persons education per se is not able to determine her/his
attitudes towards immigrants. On the contrary, education is a tool through which knowledge and
awareness of the phenomena can be gained and this crucially determines a persons opinion. One
of the channels through which this knowledge is acquired is the consumption of cultural goods.
For this reason, the variable of interest for the analysis that follows will be the change in the
impact of education on attitudes induced by the individual exposure to cultural goods. From the
econometric point of view, this e¤ect (call it 7) is identied as the interaction e¤ect derived from
the a linear probability model34 dened as follows (for each individual i living in country c):
pro_immigic = tc + 1parentsic + 2femaleic + 3ageic+
+ 4incomeic + 5lr_scaleic + 6educationic+
+ 7(educationic  extensive_m arg inc) + FEic
Testing the sign and signicance of this e¤ect will answer to the question of wether exposure
to foreign cultural goods can positively a¤ects attitudes towards immigrants. Standard errors and
statistics are then computed using a linearization method. The latter allows for heteroskedasticity or
34Note that the same estimation has been conducted applying a probit model and results are robust to di¤erent
model specication. Results from probit estimation, deriving from an equation of the form pr(pro_immigicjxic) =
[+t+c+1parentsic+2femaleic+3ageic+4incomeic+5lr_scaleic+6educationic+7(educationic 
extensive_m arg inc)] , are reported in the appendix. The interaction e¤ect in that case, following Ai and Norton
(2003), can be dened as:  = @
2(:)
@educationic@extensive_m arg inc
=
@[@(:)((6+7extensive_m arg inc))]
@extensive_m arg inc
and it is
reported in the appendix as well.
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other violations of distributional assumptions and for correlation among the observations belonging
to the same cluster35 . For this reason, inference is robust to model misspecication and corrects
for possible clusters in the data at country or regional level. Moreover, the estimation takes into
account both design and population size weights.
The equation has thus been estimated for di¤erent specications of the dependent variable36 .
Given the idea that the positive e¤ect of exposure to cultural goods on attitudes towards mi-
gration depends directly on its ability to promote multiculturalism, is important to understand
whether the positive opinion toward immigrants is actually mediated by the belief that they may
enrich the cultural of the host country and increase its quality of life. For this reason I estimate the
same equation as above considering two additional dependent variables. In particular the survey
provides individual answers to two additional questions which can be relevant in this perspective:
3. "Would you say that [country]s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people
coming to live here from other countries?"
4. "Is [country] made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here from other
countries?"
On the basis of these two questions I build two additional dummy variables dened as follows:
 pro_immig3 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the answer to question 3 is >5 and 0
otherwise37
 pro_immig4 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the answer to question 4 is >5 and 0
otherwise38
Table 3 below reports semi-elasticities39 of the response variable to di¤erent regressors and the
35Clusters are considered at the country level, but results are robust when clustering at the regional level.
36Note that the same index of extensive margin has been also considered separately for each good included in the
aggregate idex. Using such data, the equation dened above has also been estimated considering separately di¤erent
cultural goods. Results are reported in the appendix and do not di¤er signicantly among the various goods.
37 In a scale ranging from 0 to 10 where: 0=Cultural life undermined and 10=Cultural life enriched
38 In a scale ranging from 0 to 10 where: 0=Worse place to live and 10=Better place to live
39 In general the semi-elasticity of y with respect to x is dened as dyex() = (dy/dx)*(x). Given that all continuous
variable are transformed in logarithm term their coe¢ cient can be interpreted as elasticities, but since the dependent
variable is a dummy it is not possible to compute a full elasticity. As far as dummy variables are concerned, the
coe¢ cient represent the e¤ect of a discrete change from 0 to 1.
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interaction e¤ect as dened above.
Table 3: Exposure to imported cultural goods
pro_immig same
ethnicity
pro_immig
different ethnicity
pro_immig cultural
enrichment
pro_immig welfare
increase
b/t b/t b/t b/t
married -0.002 -0.016*** -0.028*** -0.014***
(-0.39) (-2.69) (-4.82) (-2.74)
child -0.018*** -0.008 -0.007 -0.010*
(-2.89) (-1.42) (-1.26) (-1.94)
unemployed -0.039*** -0.018 0.007 0.011
(-3.12) (-1.44) (0.38) (0.80)
female -0.009** -0.005 0.002 -0.007
(-2.14) (-1.03) (0.32) (-1.30)
age -0.036*** -0.067*** -0.004 -0.001
(-4.33) (-7.16) (-0.60) (-0.21)
income 0.013*** 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.012***
(8.32) (10.64) (8.83) (7.97)
left-right scale -0.011*** -0.022*** -0.020*** -0.015***
(-6.98) (-9.81) (-9.37) (-6.92)
education (years) -0.300* -0.543*** -1.133*** -1.057***
(-1.90) (-3.25) (-7.08) (-8.27)
exposure 0.107*** 0.166*** 0.297*** 0.264***
(3.06) (4.40) (8.09) (8.76)
country-year FE
constant 0.150** 0.153*** 0.162*** 0.046
(2.53) (2.63) (2.59) (0.79)
Observations 100910 100910 100910 100910
R2 0.092 0.11 0.126 0.07
Robust T-statistics in parenthesis, corrected for possible correlation within clusters.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
YES YESYES YES
First of all, it is important to notice that all coe¢ cients, when signicant, are of the expected
sign in all groups of regressions. In particular, as far as economic variables are concerned: be-
ing unemployed slightly decreases the probability of being favorable to immigrants of the same
race/ethnicity, while having higher income, on average, increases the probability of approving im-
migrants. Both results are in line with previous studies, highlighting the perceived competition
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between immigrants and natives on the labor market. The di¢ culty in nding a job strengthens
this perceived threat, while high income eases it. As far as immigrants of a di¤erent ethnicity
are concerned, the labour market e¤ect disappear, indicating a weak perceived substitutability of
natives with such immigrants. Higher income is relevant also when considering opinions over cul-
tural enrichment and welfare increase, a result that indicate the fact that the higher the individual
wealth, the higher the possibility to enjoy cultural amenities.
The e¤ect of political preferences also conrms the prior: since the higher the score on this
variable (i.e. the more oriented towards right the individual is), the lower the probability of favouring
immigration. As explained before this could be explained by the fact that right parties are usually
associated to more conservative policies.
As far as demographic variables are concerned, as expected, increasing age is associated with
adversion towards immigration and the other controls indicate that being married and having a
child, when signicant, decrease the probability of opposing immigration. The impact of education
seems to be only as a tool to access cultural goodsconsumption, as it is clear form the interaction
e¤ect reported. The latter e¤ect is stronger when considering attitudes towards immigrant of a
di¤erent race/ethnicity.
Considering more closely the cultural dimension and more generally the quality of life results
are clearly conrmed. This suggests the idea that tolerance towards ethnic diversity is linked to
perceived cultural distance.
3 Robustness checks
The rst robustness check I propose is meant at discussing whether the e¤ect obtained in the
previous analysis is a pure statistical e¤ect or if it is a specicity of cultural goods. In order to
build the counterfactual case, I introduce two homogeneous non cultural goods: HS-2702 (Lignite,
except jell) and HS-2712 (petroleum in jelly, petroleum wax and other mineral waxes). Note that,
rst of all, classical goods are characterized by a much smaller number of importing countries than
the cultural goods: lignite is imported from 2 to 10 partner countries, while petroleum is imported
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by 7 to 41 partner countries. This di¤erence is already a rst piece of evidence of the importance
of the extensive margin in the case of cultural goods. Having said that, I run the same regression
as in the previous section considering these two non cultural goods. If the results previously found
were just a statistical e¤ect, the positive and signicant e¤ect of the exposures coe¢ cient should
be present also in this case. Results of this exercise are presented in tables 4 and 5 below.
Table 4. Exposure to 2702 (Lignite, except jell)
pro_immig same
ethnicity
pro_immig
different ethnicity
pro_immig cultural
enrichment
pro_immig
welfare increase
married 0.001 -0.017** -0.031*** -0.018***
(0.17) (-2.52) (-5.16) (-3.31)
child -0.015** -0.003 -0.004 -0.008
(-2.19) (-0.48) (-0.66) (-1.57)
unemployed -0.040*** -0.023 -0.003 0.002
(-2.62) (-1.59) (-0.16) (0.15)
female -0.010** -0.007 0.001 -0.010*
(-2.21) (-1.34) (0.13) (-1.86)
age -0.027*** -0.057*** -0.003 -0.003
(-3.03) (-5.89) (-0.32) (-0.45)
income 0.013*** 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.013***
(7.40) (10.49) (7.86) (7.53)
left-right scale -0.014*** -0.025*** -0.022*** -0.018***
(-8.06) (-10.15) (-8.76) (-7.31)
education (years) 15.672*** 22.659*** -4.637 1.214
(22.24) (4.26) (-0.13) (0.04)
exposure -15.477*** -22.437*** 4.87 -1.062
(-13.36) (-4.39) (0.13) (-0.03)
country-year FE
constant 17.060*** 24.665*** -5.372 1.083
(11.55) (4.32) -(0.13) (0.03)
Observations 83774 83774 83774 83774
R2 0.08 0.105 0.127 0.076
Robust T-statistics in parenthesis, corrected for possible correlation within clusters.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
YES YES YES YES
Results conrm that the impact of such goods on pro-immigration attitudes is either not signif-
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icantly di¤erent from zero or negative, thus the positive e¤ect is specic to cultural goods.
Table 5. Exposure to 2712 (petroleum in jelly, petroleum wax and other mineral waxes)
pro_immig same
ethnicity
pro_immig
different ethnicity
pro_immig cultural
enrichment
pro_immig
welfare increase
married -0.002 -0.017*** -0.028*** -0.014***
(-0.44) (-2.77) (-4.9) (-2.81)
child -0.016*** -0.006 -0.003 -0.006
(-2.68) (-1.02) (-0.54) (-1.25)
unemployed -0.038*** -0.017 0.01 0.013
(-3.01) (-1.29) (0.50) (0.96)
female -0.009** -0.005 0.002 -0.006
(-2.13) (-1.02) (0.38) (-1.24)
age -0.036*** -0.067*** -0.004 -0.001
(-4.32) (-7.09) (-0.56) (-0.19)
income 0.013*** 0.016*** 0.017*** 0.013***
(8.51) (10.80) (8.92) (8.18)
left-right scale -0.012*** -0.022*** -0.020*** -0.015***
(-6.94) (-9.72) (-9.29) (-6.85)
education (years) 0.708*** 0.561*** 0.397*** 0.553***
(17.06) (16.20) (8.71) (12.95)
exposure -0.531*** -0.366*** -0.212*** -0.436***
(-13.66) (-12.04) (-5.00) (-10.92)
country-year FE
constant 1.787*** 1.257*** 0.747*** 1.343***
(17.14) (13.74) (6.57) (12.59)
Observations 100910 100910 100910 100910
R2 0.091 0.108 0.121 0.065
Robust T-statistics in parenthesis, corrected for possible correlation within clusters.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
YES YES YES YES
The second robustness check that I consider points to the possible bias derived from the fact
that the measure of diversity in cultural goods consumption I consider derives from a country level
variable, while the mechanism I are inspecting is taking place at the micro-level. This approach
is mainly due to data limitation since data on trade in cultural goods are only available at the
national level. Exposure to cultural goods varieties that enter a country could be very di¤erent in
the various regions and it is likely to be enhanced in urban areas rather than in small villages or
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rural territories.
Table 6: Exposure to imported cultural goods (city)
pro_immig same
ethnicity
pro_immig different
ethnicity
pro_immig cultural
enrichment
pro_immig welfare
increase
married 0.005 -0.007 -0.020*** -0.006
(0.845) (-1.469) (-2.757) (-0.704)
child -0.018*** -0.007 -0.004 -0.007
(-3.083) (-0.830) (-0.710) (-1.256)
unemployed -0.042*** -0.021 0.008 0.006
(-4.569) (-1.538) (0.441) (0.367)
female -0.011*** -0.007 0.002 -0.008
(-2.794) (-0.830) (0.177) (-0.902)
age -0.040** -0.074*** -0.012 -0.009
(-2.482) (-4.143) (-0.953) (-0.868)
income 0.011*** 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.010***
(5.283) (7.590) (5.209) (4.991)
left-right scale -0.011*** -0.022*** -0.019*** -0.015**
(-3.216) (-3.789) (-3.434) (-2.631)
education (years) -0.036 -0.108 -0.203 -0.212
(-0.265) (-0.652) (-1.310) (-1.650)
exposure 0.050* 0.067* 0.085** 0.072**
(1.765) (1.918) (2.471) (2.541)
city 0.154** 0.073 0.049 0.023
(2.363) (0.899) (0.876) (0.248)
city*education -0.087 -0.070 -0.093 -0.086
(-1.673) (-0.928) (-1.412) (-1.455)
city*exposure 0.008 0.013 0.018 0.019**
(0.885) (1.144) (1.449) (2.478)
region-year FE
constant -0.018 0.175** 0.059 0.009
(-0.240) (2.139) (0.600) (0.125)
Observations
R2 95,480 95,480 95,480 95,480
0.117 0.135 0.144 0.091
Robust T-statistics in parenthesis, corrected for possible correlation within clusters.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
YES YES YES YES
For this reason I augment my previous specication to take into account regional controls and
whether there is a di¤erential e¤ect of cultural goods on individuals living in big cities. To this aim I
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substitute country-year xed e¤ects with region-year dummies and I interact the term representing
exposure to foreign cultural goods with a dummy that equals 1 if the individual lives in a big city
(dummy "city"40). Results are presented in the table 6 above.
Results show that active exposure to imported cultural goods is important in general and not
only for individuals living in big cities. Nonetheless, if we disaggregate the analysis considering
each good separately, as shown in the appendix, it is clear that for some good the overall e¤ect
of cultural goods on attitudes towards immigrants is driven is driven by individuals living in big
cities only and for other it is a characteristic of the whole population. In particular results indicate
that, when considering foreign reading books and newspapers/journals /periodicals, a wider access
to such good is possible only for individuals living in big cities, while when considering works of
art and foreign lms the general e¤ect of exposure is conrmed, as museums and cinema are more
homogeneously distributed within countries.
3.1 Instrumental variables
An other important source of bias is the fact that estimations may present a problem of endo-
geneity. Such problem can derive from two di¤erent issues: reverse causality on the one side and
omitted variable bias on the other. In principle, unobserved individual heterogeneity should be
mitigated by the use of country level variables when studying their impact on individual behavior
and opinions. However, a reverse causality problem is di¢ cult to avoid. In fact, the relationship
between consumption of cultural goods and attitudes towards migration could be a self reinforcing
process. For this reason, I introduce instrumental variable techniques in the analysis: in a two
stages OLS procedure, the index of exposure to foreign cultural goods is instrumented using the
overall number of museum present in the country, specialized stores selling newspapers and books
retailers41 . We expect that the variables on which the instrument is based are correlated with the
40The question from which the dummy is built is the following: "Which phrase on this card best describes the area
where you live?". Possible answers are: 1="A big city"; 2="The suburbs or outskirts of a big city"; 3="A town or
a small city"; 4="A country village"; 5="A farm or home in the countryside". The dummy city equals one if the
answer to the above question take values 1 or 2 and zero otherwise.
41Note that in the appendix I report results of IV estimation also for each cultural good considered separately. In
that case di¤erent instrumental variables are considered: antiques are instrumented using the number of museums
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endogenous regressor as they represent the distribution channels of the cultural goods considered.
At the same, time we expect them to be exogenous as they are not limited to foreign cultural goods,
but to also to domestic ones.
Results are reported in table 7 below. Results on the coe¢ cient of interest are conrmed.
Table 7. IV estimation _imported cultural goods
pro_immig same
ethnicity
pro_immig
different ethnicity
pro_immig cultural
enrichment
pro_immig
welfare increase
married 0.002 -0.017*** -0.031*** -0.018***
(0.38) (-2.62) (-5.19) (-3.16)
child -0.013** 0.003 0 -0.005
(-2.35) (0.48) (0.02) (-0.79)
unemployed -0.046*** -0.045*** -0.021 -0.023*
(-2.91) (-3.17) (-1.29) (-1.72)
female -0.010** -0.005 0.006 -0.007
(-2.21) (-0.76) (0.98) (-1.21)
age -0.052*** -0.076*** -0.009 -0.001
(-5.8) (-7.08) (-0.96) (-0.17)
income 0.014*** 0.015*** 0.017*** 0.012***
(8.85) (10.10) (10.50) (7.27)
left-right scale -0.015*** -0.028*** -0.026*** -0.020***
(-9.77) (-11.5) (-11.49) (-8.38)
education (years) -0.407* -0.547** -1.051*** -0.598***
(-1.68) (-1.99) (-4.22) (-3.49)
exposure 0.135** 0.172*** 0.282*** 0.164***
(2.47) (2.76) (4.91) (4.11)
Observations 77275 77275 77275 77275
R2 0.047 0.068 0.056 0.03
Robust T-statistics in parenthesis, corrected for possible correlation within clusters.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
country-year FE YESYES YES YES
First stage diagnostic is reported in table 8 below. Results indicate that the instrument consid-
present in the country, cinematograph lms using cinema entries, newspapers using specialized stores selling news-
papers and books using books retailers. Data on the number of rms and museums are retrieved from Amadeus
database (Bureau Van Dijk), while the number of cinema entries derive from the European Audiovisual Observatory
database.
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ered allows identication and suggest that the instrument is su¢ ciently strong.
Table 8. IV estimation _First stage diagnostic
First stage
married -0.006 ***
child 0.004 ***
unemployed 0.004 *
female -0.002 **
age 0.007 ***
income 0.001 **
left-right scale -0.001 ***
education 3.508 ***
instrument 0.137 ***
F test of excluded instruments:
  F(  1,   294) =   233.77
  Prob > F      =   0.0000
Angrist-Pischke multivariate F test of excluded instruments:
  F(  1,   294) =   233.77
  Prob > F      =   0.0000
Underidentification test
Ho: matrix of reduced form coefficients has rank=K1-1 (underidentified)
Ha: matrix has rank=K1 (identified)
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic          Chi-sq(1)=35.19    P-val=0.0000
Weak identification test
Ho: equation is weakly identified
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic                                   46072.12
Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic                               233.77
3.2 Conclusions
This paper o¤ers a unique empirical contribution to the literature discussing attitudes towards
immigration. In particular, the focus of the analysis is on the role of culture in shaping those
attitudes. The basic idea of the paper is that patterns of consumption of foreign cultural goods
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can inuence attitudes toward immigrants. Cultural goods, indeed, can constitute one of the so
much needed "bridges" linking di¤erent cultures: they can enhance reciprocal understanding and
favour coexistence of di¤erent cultures in the same society, building the so called multiculturalism
that recently has been claimed to be dead. Empirical evidence supports this view, showing that
a greater exposure to foreign cultural goods can have a positive e¤ect on attitudes towards immi-
grants. Indeed, heterogeneity in consumption patterns can lead to higher tolerance towards a more
heterogeneous population. This e¤ect is stronger when considering attitudes towards immigrant
of a di¤erent race/ethnicity as the majority of the native population and it is explained by an
increased awareness of the cultural enrichment that immigrants bring along, leading to an increase
in welfare of natives. The positive e¤ect of active exposure to foreign books and newspapers is
driven by individuals living in big cities, where such goods are more widespread. The positive e¤ect
of active exposure to foreign movies and works of art is more pervasive in the whole population.
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3.3 Appendix
3.3.1 Probit model
Table A1: Exposure to imported cultural goods
pro_immig same
ethnicity
pro_immig
different ethnicity
pro_immig cultural
enrichment
pro_immig
welfare increase
married -0.006 -0.045*** -0.077*** -0.038**
(-0.40) (-2.73) (-4.76) (-2.52)
child -0.049*** -0.022 -0.019 -0.029*
(-2.75) (-1.42) (-1.15) (-1.84)
unemployed -0.114*** -0.047 0.018 0.033
(-3.22) (-1.37) (0.38) (0.85)
female -0.028** -0.014 0.005 -0.02
(-2.18) (-0.97) (0.33) (-1.34)
age -0.097*** -0.182*** -0.009 -0.011
(-3.98) (-7.05) (-0.46) (-0.51)
income 0.038*** 0.041*** 0.043*** 0.036***
(8.24) (10.50) (8.82) (7.84)
left-right scale -0.034*** -0.062*** -0.055*** -0.044***
(-7.04) (-9.82) (-9.33) (-6.81)
education (years) -1.019** -1.308*** -3.016*** -3.146***
(-2.24) (-2.69) (-6.61) (-8.11)
exposure 0.342*** 0.416*** 0.794*** 0.788***
(3.36) (3.80) (7.58) (8.52)
country-year FE
constant -0.987*** -0.966*** -0.955*** -1.282***
(-5.83) (-5.78) (-5.54) (-7.29)
Observations 100910 100910 100910 100910
R2
Robust T-statistics in parenthesis, corrected for possible correlation within clusters.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
YES YESYES YES
68
Table A2: Marginal e¤ect of interaction terms
1.37 ** 3.41 *** 1.206564 *** 1.722979 ***
pro_immig1 pro_immig2 pro_immig3 pro_immig4
3.3.2 Disaggregated specication of exposure index
Table A3: Exposure to imported antiques (9706)
pro_immig1 pro_immig2 pro_immig3 pro_immig4
married 0.003 -0.012* -0.025*** -0.009
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008)
child -0.022*** -0.012 -0.006 -0.006
(0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.004)
unemployed -0.043*** -0.015 0.022 0.019
(0.012) (0.018) (0.017) (0.021)
female -0.006 -0.007 0.004 -0.003
(0.005) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
age -0.038* -0.068*** 0.001 -0.003
(0.020) (0.023) (0.010) (0.010)
income 0.011*** 0.014*** 0.015*** 0.013***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
left-right scale -0.010*** -0.019*** -0.017*** -0.013**
(0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
education (years) 0.008 -0.074 -0.231*** -0.207***
(0.086) (0.095) (0.068) (0.054)
exposure 0.063** 0.096*** 0.144*** 0.107***
(0.025) (0.028) (0.021) (0.020)
Country-year FE YES YES YES YES
Constant 0.006 -0.053 -0.150 -0.149
(0.101) (0.144) (0.163) (0.128)
Observations 82,618 82,618 82,618 82,618
R-squared 0.095 0.114 0.129 0.070
Robust standard errors, corrected for possible correlation within
clusters reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
9706
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Table A4: Exposure to cinematographic lm, exposed and developed (37069)
pro_immig1 pro_immig2 pro_immig3 pro_immig4
married -0.000 -0.015*** -0.028*** -0.015
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.009)
child -0.018*** -0.007 -0.006 -0.008
(0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.005)
unemployed -0.042*** -0.018 0.007 0.005
(0.011) (0.018) (0.019) (0.022)
female -0.010** -0.007 0.001 -0.006
(0.005) (0.009) (0.010) (0.008)
age -0.032** -0.063*** -0.000 0.002
(0.016) (0.017) (0.010) (0.011)
income 0.013*** 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.013***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
left-right scale -0.012*** -0.023*** -0.021*** -0.016***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
education (years) 0.023 -0.026 -0.147 -0.158
(0.091) (0.121) (0.134) (0.100)
exposure 0.076* 0.106* 0.150** 0.123**
(0.040) (0.055) (0.064) (0.048)
Country-year FE YES YES YES YES
Constant 0.019 -0.013 -0.038 -0.113
(0.096) (0.127) (0.158) (0.127)
Observations 95,627 95,627 95,627 95,627
R-squared 0.094 0.111 0.127 0.069
Robust standard errors, corrected for possible correlation within
clusters reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
37069
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Table A5: Exposure to newspapers, journals and periodicals (4902)
pro_immig1 pro_immig2 pro_immig3 pro_immig4
married 0.000 -0.014** -0.028*** -0.015*
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008)
child -0.018*** -0.008 -0.006 -0.008
(0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.005)
unemployed -0.040*** -0.016 0.006 0.006
(0.011) (0.017) (0.019) (0.022)
female -0.010** -0.006 0.001 -0.006
(0.005) (0.009) (0.010) (0.008)
age -0.036* -0.068*** -0.001 0.002
(0.018) (0.020) (0.009) (0.010)
income 0.013*** 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.013***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
left-right scale -0.011*** -0.022*** -0.020*** -0.015***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
education (years) -0.117 -0.246 -0.605 -0.485
(0.279) (0.377) (0.427) (0.309)
exposure 0.085 0.125 0.216* 0.164**
(0.072) (0.097) (0.111) (0.080)
Country-year FE YES YES YES YES
Constant 0.081 0.075 0.080 -0.023
(0.093) (0.131) (0.155) (0.127)
Observations 98,659 98,659 98,659 98,659
R-squared 0.093 0.110 0.124 0.068
Robust standard errors, corrected for possible correlation within clusters
reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
4902
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Table A6: Exposure to reading books (490199)
pro_immig1 pro_immig2 pro_immig3 pro_immig4
married 0.000 -0.014** -0.028*** -0.015*
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008)
child -0.018*** -0.009 -0.009 -0.011**
(0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.005)
unemployed -0.041*** -0.016 0.005 0.005
(0.011) (0.017) (0.018) (0.021)
female -0.010** -0.006 0.002 -0.006
(0.005) (0.009) (0.010) (0.008)
age -0.036** -0.068*** -0.002 0.001
(0.018) (0.020) (0.009) (0.010)
income 0.012*** 0.014*** 0.015*** 0.012***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
left-right scale -0.011*** -0.022*** -0.020*** -0.015***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
education (years) -0.371 -0.745 -1.434*** -1.345***
(0.385) (0.498) (0.465) (0.312)
exposure 0.133 0.225* 0.381*** 0.342***
(0.088) (0.115) (0.109) (0.076)
Country-year FE YES YES YES YES
Constant 0.093 0.102 0.125 0.030
(0.077) (0.099) (0.119) (0.088)
Observations 98,659 98,659 98,659 98,659
R-squared 0.093 0.112 0.127 0.071
490199
Robust standard errors, corrected for possible correlation within clusters
reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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3.3.3 Robustness checks with disaggregated exposure index
Table A7: Exposure to imported antiques (9706)
pro_immig1 pro_immig2 pro_immig3 pro_immig4
married 0.008 -0.007 -0.020*** -0.005
(0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008)
child -0.022*** -0.010 -0.005 -0.006
(0.006) (0.008) (0.005) (0.004)
unemployed -0.041*** -0.018 0.017 0.015
(0.009) (0.014) (0.014) (0.016)
female -0.007 -0.008 0.005 -0.002
(0.005) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
age -0.040** -0.071*** 0.001 -0.002
(0.019) (0.022) (0.011) (0.010)
income 0.010*** 0.012*** 0.014*** 0.011***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
left-right scale -0.010*** -0.019*** -0.016*** -0.013**
(0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
education (years) 0.046 -0.095 -0.231*** -0.184***
(0.104) (0.122) (0.065) (0.059)
exposure 0.054* 0.100*** 0.143*** 0.101***
(0.030) (0.034) (0.020) (0.022)
city 0.302 -0.021 -0.073 0.111
(0.243) (0.222) (0.168) (0.176)
city#education -0.103 0.033 0.021 -0.044
(0.097) (0.092) (0.058) (0.067)
city#exposure 0.023 -0.008 -0.007 0.013
(0.029) (0.026) (0.019) (0.022)
Region-year FE YES YES YES YES
Constant 0.451* 0.853*** 1.490*** 1.134***
(0.231) (0.263) (0.179) (0.159)
Observations 82,618 82,618 82,618 82,618
R-squared 0.119 0.138 0.150 0.094
Robust standard errors, corrected for possible correlation within clusters
reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
9706
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Table A8: Exposure to cinematographic lm, exposed and developed (37069)
pro_immig1 pro_immig2 pro_immig3 pro_immig4
married 0.004 -0.010** -0.023*** -0.011
(0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.009)
child -0.017** -0.005 -0.005 -0.007
(0.006) (0.009) (0.007) (0.005)
unemployed -0.040*** -0.019 0.006 0.005
(0.008) (0.014) (0.015) (0.017)
female -0.011** -0.007 0.002 -0.006
(0.004) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
age -0.034** -0.066*** -0.001 0.001
(0.015) (0.016) (0.010) (0.011)
income 0.012*** 0.013*** 0.015*** 0.011***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
left-right scale -0.011*** -0.022*** -0.020*** -0.016***
(0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
education (years) 0.075 -0.021 -0.129 -0.114
(0.109) (0.142) (0.117) (0.087)
exposure 0.060 0.100 0.140** 0.103**
(0.047) (0.061) (0.056) (0.045)
city 0.281 0.096 0.075 0.276
(0.256) (0.324) (0.209) (0.235)
city#education -0.110 -0.024 -0.046 -0.115
(0.104) (0.138) (0.081) (0.093)
city#exposure 0.028 0.014 0.023 0.055
(0.037) (0.049) (0.031) (0.033)
Region-year FE YES YES YES YES
Constant 0.168 0.602* 0.943*** 0.747***
(0.241) (0.324) (0.323) (0.221)
Observations 95,627 95,627 95,627 95,627
R-squared 0.120 0.137 0.149 0.094
Robust standard errors, corrected for possible correlation within clusters
reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
37069
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Table A9: Exposure to newspapers, journals and periodicals (4902)
pro_immig1 pro_immig2 pro_immig3 pro_immig4
married 0.005 -0.009* -0.023*** -0.011
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008)
child -0.017*** -0.007 -0.005 -0.008
(0.006) (0.009) (0.007) (0.005)
unemployed -0.038*** -0.018 0.004 0.006
(0.008) (0.013) (0.015) (0.016)
female -0.011** -0.007 0.002 -0.006
(0.004) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008)
age -0.038** -0.071*** -0.001 0.002
(0.017) (0.019) (0.010) (0.011)
income 0.011*** 0.013*** 0.015*** 0.011***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
left-right scale -0.011*** -0.022*** -0.019*** -0.015**
(0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
education (years) 0.078 -0.067 -0.485 -0.370
(0.259) (0.364) (0.418) (0.270)
exposure 0.038 0.077 0.184* 0.133*
(0.068) (0.095) (0.108) (0.072)
city 1.117*** 1.105** 0.879** 0.912
(0.336) (0.493) (0.391) (0.588)
city#education -0.463*** -0.456** -0.362** -0.372
(0.131) (0.202) (0.143) (0.234)
city#exposure 0.111*** 0.122** 0.098** 0.102*
(0.033) (0.051) (0.038) (0.058)
Region-year FE YES YES YES YES
Constant 0.038 0.765 2.189** 1.641**
(0.618) (0.860) (0.974) (0.619)
Observations 98,659 98,659 98,659 98,659
R-squared 0.118 0.136 0.147 0.092
Robust standard errors, corrected for possible correlation within clusters
reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
4902
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Table A10 : Exposure to reading books (490199)
pro_immig1 pro_immig2 pro_immig3 pro_immig4
married 0.005 -0.009* -0.023*** -0.011
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008)
child -0.018*** -0.008 -0.008 -0.010**
(0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.005)
unemployed -0.038*** -0.018 0.003 0.005
(0.008) (0.013) (0.015) (0.016)
female -0.010** -0.006 0.002 -0.005
(0.004) (0.009) (0.010) (0.008)
age -0.038** -0.071*** -0.002 0.001
(0.017) (0.019) (0.010) (0.011)
income 0.011*** 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.011***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
left-right scale -0.011*** -0.022*** -0.019*** -0.015**
(0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
education (years) -0.140 -0.487 -1.290** -1.166***
(0.390) (0.526) (0.480) (0.330)
exposure 0.083 0.164 0.346*** 0.300***
(0.089) (0.120) (0.111) (0.080)
city 1.296*** 1.395** 0.778* 1.160**
(0.395) (0.672) (0.404) (0.494)
city#education -0.516*** -0.582* -0.336** -0.485**
(0.146) (0.288) (0.153) (0.212)
city#exposure 0.110*** 0.136** 0.081** 0.117**
(0.032) (0.064) (0.036) (0.047)
Region-year FE YES YES YES YES
Constant 0.526 1.708 4.014*** 3.521***
(0.932) (1.250) (1.160) (0.830)
Observations 98,659 98,659 98,659 98,659
R-squared 0.118 0.137 0.149 0.096
490199
Robust standard errors, corrected for possible correlation within
clusters reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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4 FDI and Growth: can di¤erent regional identities shape
the returns to foreign capital investments?
Do di¤erent types of territorial capital determine di¤erent levels of FDI-induced growth? This
paper analyses the impact of FDI on the growth rates of European regions. In so doing, it discusses
the role of di¤erent components of territorial capital in magnifying or daunting such an impact.
The paper starts from a very simple theoretical framework that claries how territorial capital can
shape the returns to foreign direct investments. The subsequent empirical analysis uses data from
the European Value Study to identify 3 soft components of territorial capital that dene the identity
of a region and can be relevant in shaping the impact of foreign capital on local growth. Using
data from Eurostat and FDIregio database, the paper studies the impact of FDI induced spillovers
on regional growth in European regions, controlling for possible endogeneity. Results indicate that
technological spillovers are an important source of regional growth, but they take place only if the
level of trustworthiness/generalized morality is widespread in the region, supporting the idea that
low free-riding attitudes increase e¢ ciency of transaction and e¤ectiveness of cooperation between
multinational and the regional economic system. The e¤ect of relational capital is more ambiguous.
A more disaggregated analysis reveals that some e¤ects vary depending on the origin (intra vs extra
European FDI) and on the type of economic activity (manufacturing vs service FDI).
4.1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to disentangle the impact of foreign investments on the increasingly
di¤erentiated trajectories of regional growth. Recent developments in regional science show that
growth determinants cannot be fully identied through deterministic cause-e¤ect relationships,
but need to take into account manifold relationships between economic agents, largely dependent
on perceptions. Given that economic growth mainly depends on the ability of regions to take
advantage of potential opportunities to sustain their competitiveness, the idea is that the latter
largely depends on a complex combination of informal factors. These factors have been recently
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dened in the literature as the soft components of territorial capital (See Camagni, 2008).42 This
paper discuss how a very local element such as territorial capital may enable (or hamper) regions
ability to take advantage of globalization in the form of FDI inows.
The traditional approach to discuss the relation between FDI and regional growth is based on
theoretical arguments regarding the likely sources of knowledge and technological spillovers from
foreign direct investment (FDI) and issues concerning the role these spillovers can play in fostering
growth and development at regional level. Many policy makers and academics argue that FDI can
have important positive e¤ects on a host locations development e¤orts, the main reason being that,
in addition to the direct capital nancing it supplies, FDI is also a valuable source of technology and
know-how. Hence, the impact of FDI on growth is expected to go beyond its contribution to local
production capacity. Indeed, it can promote growth by stimulating productivity gains resulting
from spillovers to local rms. While technology may widespread through several channels, FDI is
one of the main mechanism through which host economies can gain access to advanced technologies
as well as managerial knowledge and skills. This may help in increasing development opportunities
for regions.
These arguments are very common in the literature based on country level evidence and do
not consider that, at sub-national level, the FDI-growth relationship becomes more ambiguous.
At the regional level, indeed, important local factors can undermine or reinforce the FDI-growth
relationship, depending on the regional ability to fully exploit their economic potential. Local ex-
ternalities, local assets, relational distance, local governance, cultural elements and values are all
crucial elements in dening the exibility and the catching up ability of regions in taking advantage
of FDI spillovers and complementarities. Theoretical arguments motivating the potential of terri-
torial capital for higher returns on investments are manifold and can be found in di¤erent strands
of theoretical literature, such as the limited rationality theory (Malgrem, 1961; Simon, 1972), con-
tract theory (Williamson, 2002) and the cognitive approach to district economies (Camagni, 1991;
Storper, 1995).
42Territorial capital is broadly dened as the set of localized assets that constitute the competitive potential
of a territory. Its soft components are organizational, relational and social capital. See Camagni (2008) for a
comprehensive discussion.
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These considerations suggest that FDI alone is not enough to generate a sustainable pattern
of economic growth. There are factors that can magnify or inhibit the impact of FDI on growth,
all other growth determinants held constant. In this paper, I argue that the extent to which a
region would take advantage of FDI depends on the endowment and composition of its territorial
capital. Do di¤erent levels of social capital determine di¤erent levels of FDI induced growth?
Does the closeness of a region towards external and diverse contributions matter in the FDI-growth
relationship? How relational capital inuences the impact of FDI on the process of economic growth
at local level?
In order to provide an answer to these research questions, I rst dene the theoretical mechanism
through which territorial capital inuence the FDI-growth relationship, starting from a simple
neoclassical framework. Then I assess the impact of FDI on economic growth, testing and controlling
for possible endogeneity. Additionally, I introduce those soft components of the territorial capital
that may exert on impact on the transmission of FDI induced spillovers to the local economy, such
as social capital and relational territorial capital and closeness of the region. Such soft components
of territorial capital may enhance the opportunities of a region to take advantage of knowledge by
more advanced organizations or markets. Finally, I consider separately the e¤ect of di¤erent types
of FDI inows, decomposed according to macro-sectors of activity and broad geographic origin.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature and
discusses the theoretical foundations of this study. Section 3 describes empirical trends in FDI and
growth in Europe and then focuses on detailed description of the construction of territorial capital
endowments indexes for European regions. Section 4 presents a simple theoretical framework
showing how territorial capital can shape the returns to FDI and denes the estimation strategy.
Section 5 is devoted to discussion of results. Major conclusions and a summary of the ndings are
discussed in Section 6.
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4.2 Theoretical background and relevant literature
The existing empirical literature on FDI has focused on three di¤erent aspects: i) why foreign rms
invest abroad; ii) what drives inward FDI ows; iii) what the impacts on host economies are and
whether they are positive or negative. Only the third aspect is of interest for the present study,
focusing on European NUTS2 regions as territorial units.
Generally speaking, the literature acknowledges that FDI plays a relevant role in economic de-
velopment processes of host economies through several channels, which go far beyond the increase
in the local endowment of nancial and physical capital. In the neoclassical growth models à la
Solow (Solow, 1956) this implies that foreign investments do not only contribute to factor accumu-
lation, complementing local endowments, but they can also contribute to technological growth or
the so called Solow residual. Indeed, the impact of FDI may be more relevant because of the
presence of such indirect e¤ects that increase total factor productivity because of the transfer of
new technologies and improvement in the e¢ ciency of production.
Part of these indirect e¤ects that benet the host economies, called more properly spillovers, arise
since multinational rms cannot completely internalize the benets of knowledge and technologies
which are at the base of their competitive advantage (Kokko, 1994; Markusen, 1995). The intensity
of these spillovers may vary according to their nature intra- or inter-sectoral. While multinational
rms try to avoid intra-sectoral spillovers because they benet their direct competitors, they may
produce inter-sectoral spillovers since they benet suppliers and clients (Kugler, 2006). Moreover,
indirect e¤ects may arise because of increased competition that forces domestic rms to improve
their e¢ ciency of production, resulting in productivity gains for the whole region, as the literature
on rm heterogeneity suggests (see, for instance, Barrios et al., 2005). Finally, another important
indirect e¤ect arising from the presence of multinational rms is export spillover, which a¤ects local
rmsexport decisions (Girma et al., 2004; Kneller and Pisu, 2007).
Focusing on spilloverstransmission (see Barba Navaretti and Venables, 2004), it can take place
through imitation processes, labour force training, pro-competitive e¤ects, and input-output link-
ages (Blomstrom and Kokko, 1998). Regardless of the channel chosen, the impact of FDI on growth
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is far from being automatic; rather, it depends on the degree of complementarity and substitutabil-
ity between foreign and domestic capitals (De Mello, 1999), the degree of development of the host
economies (Johnson, 2006; Carkovic and Levine, 2005; Blonigen and Wang, 2005), the capacity of
the host economy to absorb new technologies and knowledge brought by foreign rms (Borensztein
et al., 1998), the degree of openness of the host economies (Balasubramanyam et al., 1996), the
degree of embeddedness of foreign rms in the local economies (Markusen and Venables, 1999;
Rodriguez-Clare, 1996) and other host economiescharacteristics, such as the quality of the institu-
tions and, generally speaking, the business environment (Olofsdotter, 1998; Blomstom and Kokko,
2003; Xu, 2000).
Despite the plethora of FDI-growth studies, the relationship between FDI and growth is still
not clear, since many of these works are based on aggregate data on FDI, which do not allow either
to distinguish between di¤erent types of FDI (vertical vs. horizontal; greeneld vs. other forms of
FDI), which is potentially important (Beugelsdijk et al., 2008) or to consider host economies at a
ner geographical disaggregation (sub-national levels). Consequently, it is implicitly assumed that,
on the one hand, di¤erent types of FDI have the same impact on economic growth rates, and, on the
other hand, that the impact of FDI on economic growth is constant across space. Finally, with few
exceptions, most studies focus on FDI in manufacturing, while ignoring either ner disaggregation
within the manufacturing sector or FDI in services.43
When the FDI-growth relationship is considered at sub-national level, ambiguities increase even
more. Generally speaking, Mullen and Williams (2005) argue that the impact of FDI on growth is
not a¤ected by the dimension of the geographical unit taken into consideration, while Girma and
Wakelin (2001) claim for a regional dimension of FDI for several reasons. First of all, the e¤ects of
FDI related spillovers are expected to be localized. Secondly, it is not clear whether laggard regions
are able to benet from the presence of foreign rms: a foreign investment increases local capital
accumulation, but the host economy might not possess the capacity to absorb the knowledge and
the technology incorporated in such an investment (Findlay, 1978; Blomstrom and Kokko, 1998).
Other ambiguities relate to the expected transfer of superior technology from foreign to domestic
43Bobonis and Shatz (2007), Alfano (2003) and Girma and Wakelin (2001) represent notable exceptions.
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rms, based on the assumption that foreign rms are by denition technologically superior to
domestic rms (Markusen, 1995). But, what happens when foreign rms undertake an investment
in a technologically advanced region in order to exploit its knowledge (Dunning, 1999; Cantwell,
1989)?
In conclusion, there remains a clear need to quantify the impact of FDI on regional economic
performance. This paper addresses these issues in the context of the European Union. In so doing,
it will not only augment the existing evidence on the impact of FDI on EU regionsperformance,
which is quite scarce, but also try to overcome some of the ambiguities that still plague the lit-
erature.44 More specically, this study aims at uncovering whether the complexity of the FDI-
growth relationship depends on the substantial heterogeneity in regional identities. Such identities
encompass both soft and hard resources of local economies, that constitute the building blocks of
the so called territorial capital.
It is now recognized that each area has a specic capital  its territorial capital that is
distinct from that of other areas and is determined by many factors [. . . ]. These factors may include
the areas geographical location, size, factor of production endowment, climate, traditions, natural
resources, quality of life or the agglomeration economies provided by its cities, but may also include
its business incubators and industrial districts or other business networks that reduce transaction
costs. Other factors may be untraded interdependencies such as understandings, customs and
informal rules that enable economic actors to work together under conditions of uncertainty, or
the solidarity, mutual assistance and co-opting of ideas that often develop in clusters of small
and medium-sized enterprises working in the same sector (social capital). Lastly, according to
Marshall, there is an intangible factor, something in the air, called the environmentand which
is the outcome of a combination of institutions, rules, practices, producers, researchers and policy
makers, that make certain creativity and innovation possible. This territorial capitalgenerates a
higher return for specic kinds of investments than for others, since they are better suited to the
44Studies examining the regional dimension of FDI generally deal with location choice rather than the impact on
growth and productivity. Exceptions include Figlio and Blonigen (2000), Leichenko and Ericson (1997), Bode and
Nunnekamp (2010), Bode et al. (2009) and Mullen and Williams (2005). All of them refer to the experience of US
State. As for Europe is concerned, the existing works concentrate on specic countries or groups of them, mainly
located in Central and Eastern Europe (Girma and Wakelin, 2007; Dri¢ eld, 2006; Nicolini and Resmini, 2011).
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area and use its assets and potential more e¤ectively(OECD, 2001, p.15).
The role of territorial capital is increasingly recognized in its importance for the e¤ectiveness of
regional policies and is inspiring the reform of European regional policies towards a more placed-
based approach, that started after the publication of the well known Barca Report (Barca, 2009).
In this perspective, Barca et al. (2012) sustain that if convergence is to be promoted, this is
to be done by development rather than by redistribution. Theoretical arguments sustaining the
importance of a cognitive approach vis-à-vis regional development are manifold: from the theory of
limited rationality (Malmgren, 1961; Simon, 1972) to contract theory (Williamson, 2002) and the
cognitive approach to district theory (Camagni, 1991; Storper, 1995).
The interesting point in this context is to study how an element of regional identity, purely local,
such as territorial capital, can shape the impact of global forces, such as FDI, on local development.
What this paper will argue is that the role of territorial capital in releasing untapped economic
potential is fundamental because it can empower regions to take advantage of globalization benets.
Being FDI a major expression of globalization trends, I believe that their positive externalities in
local economies are likely to depend on how deep they are rooted within the local economic context.
Thus, the e¤ectiveness of the regional economy in maximizing potential spillovers will ultimately
depend on the local context and in its territorial capital. In particular I identify 3 main soft
components particularly relevant for the local returns of foreign investments in terms of regional
growth.
The rst is what I call closed social capital, summarizing the negative attitude of local agents
towards external and diversied contributions. The importance of informal components of regional
openness on regional performance has already been recognized in the literature (see Gambardella
et al., 2009), but here I focus especially on such soft components and argue that they can act as
a catalyst for benecial e¤ects of foreign investments. Indeed, the cultural closeness of a region
prevent multinationals from taking roots in the area where they establish, inhibiting local spillovers.
The second informal component of territorial capital that I deem relevant for the growth impact
of FDI is what the literature calls generalized morality or trustworthinessof citizens (see Tabellini,
2010). Generalized morality is considered a characteristic of modern democratic societies, where
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abstract rules of good conduct apply to many social situations, and not just in a small network
of personal friends and relatives. If the level of generalized trust is high in a region, it means
that low free-riding attitudes increase the e¢ ciency of transaction and e¤ectiveness of cooperation
between multinational rms and the regional economic system, thus enhancing the FDI induced
local growth.
Finally, the role of relational capital in shaping returns to foreign investments is more ambigu-
ous. The literature on territorial capital and innovation (see Capello et al., 2011) dene relational
capital in the regional context as the network component of territorial capital, the relational space
where functional and hierachical, economic and social interactions take place and are embedded in
geographical space. In this perspective, collective action and cooperation capabilities foster socio-
economic interactions, magnifying the e¤ects of knowledge creation on productivity and growth.
While this mechanism is certainly acting when considering the regional economy as a whole, it
might be a discriminating factor for foreign multinationals present in a territory. In fact, if the net-
work e¤ect of relational capital reinforce mutual understanding and social commitment within the
boundaries of such network, it might increase the relational distance with entities that are not able
to penetrate such boundaries. Relational capital will thus enhance or hinder foreign multinationals
impact on local economic development, depending on their ability of to penetrate such networks.
An additional insight from the analysis is aimed at uncovering eventual di¤erences in the inten-
sity and importance of all those e¤ect depending on the origin (intra vs. extra European FDI) and
on the type of economic activity (manufacturing vs. service FDI).
The section that follows will discuss in more detail the estimation of the three components of ter-
ritorial capital, describing their distribution in Europe and their link with FDI-growth relationship
in regions of the EU.
4.3 Empirical Evidence on territorial capital, FDI and growth in Europe
A widespread wave of globalization a¤ected world economy since the beginning of the past decade,
with FDI playing a major role as a way of internationalizing economic activity. Despite the slowdown
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caused by the recent crisis, the importance of worldwide economic integration as a fuel for sustained
growth has been recognized by all international organizations, with the European Commission
stating the importance of reinforcing the single market and ease investment procedures as a major
stimulus for growth (Europe 2020 Agenda). Indeed, multinational enterprises (MNEs) play a leading
role in shaping and driving cross-border integration through the transfer of production facilities,
functions and or technology across space (Baldwin and Martin, 1999; OECD, 2007).
A recent report on the progress of the EU towards the Europe 2020 Agenda shows that the
EU is the largest provider and recipient of FDI in the world, with intra-EU investments increasing
rapidly (Hamilton and Quinlan, 2011). These trends have been reinforced by the liberalization
of new markets, especially in the services sectors, the reduction of capital movement restraints,
and the creation of a friendly environment for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), especially in the
services sectors. Despite the cyclical character of FDI ows and their dependence from economic
fundamentals, inward FDI stocks in the EU have increased exponentially since the 1980s, reaching
their peak in 2007, with more than 7,000 billions of USD and a percentage of world stocks of
about 45%.45 In particular Intra-EU FDI, that represents around 62% of total FDI, have increased
markedly, resulting in signicant economic gains: 2.1% of EU GDP over the period 1992-2006 (500
Euros per head) and 2.75 million jobs.46
Despite that, as it is shown in Figure 1, the relationship between FDI and local growth rates
seems much complex and regions with the largest concentration of foreign rms are not necessarily
those with the highest gross value added growth rates.
45See UNCTAD, World Investment Reports, various issues for an in-depth analysis of FDI ows and stocks at
European and world levels.
46EUROPE 2020, Background Information for the Informal European Council, 11 February 2010.
86
Figure 1. The FDI-growth relationship in Europe
Indeed, the recent literature in regional science (see Camagni, 2008, for a comprehensive dis-
cussion) suggests that deterministic cause-e¤ect relationships cannot explain the complexity and
diversication of regional development patterns. As discussed in the previous section: Each Region
has a specic territorial capitalthat is distinct and generates a higher return for specic kinds of
investments than for others. Territorial development policies should rst and foremost help areas
to develop their territorial capital(European Commission-DG Regio, 2005, quoted from Camagni,
2008).
Following Van Schaik (2002), Capello et al. (2011), and Caragliu and Nijkamp (2012), I measure
social capital using results of the European Values Study.47 I do not consider all possible elements
of the territorial capital, but only those that I believe can crucially a¤ect the ability of regions
47The European Values Study (EVS) is a large-scale, cross-sectional, and longitudinal survey research project
on basic human values, initiated by the European Values Systems Study Group in the late seventies. The EVS
questionnaire was developed to measure basic value orientations in important domains of life such as religion and
morality, socio-economic life, politics, work, leisure time, family, marriage, and sexuality. We focus in particular
on results of the 1999/2000 wave of the survey, which included all European countries, except for Norway and
Switzerland, Albania and parts of former Yugoslavia.
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to take advantage of FDI for local development. The spatial distribution of these factors is quite
uneven, as it will be shown in what follows.
In more detail, I consider three di¤erent elements of the territorial capital: closed social capital,
trustworthiness (or generalized morality) and relational capital. As already mentioned, in order to
obtain a quantitative measure for each regions endowment of all types of social capital we exploit
the EVS database.
The rst component of territorial capital that I consider is specic to the lack of openness of
the region towards external and diverse contributions, both in terms of other regions, of other
European countries and of production factors coming from abroad. In particular it measures the
degree of cultural closeness of a region along four dimensions: the concerns with foreigners, the lack
of condence in big companies, the lack of trust in other citizens and the importance of national
identity with respect to European identity. Indeed, I build this last index aggregating the answers
to the following 4 questions:
- Do you trust other people in your country? [1=trust completely / 5=not trust at all]
- How much condence do you have in major companies? [1=a great deal / 5=none at all]
- Are you concerned with immigrants? [1=none at all / 5=very much]
- National Identity_ A Some people say: If the European member states were truly to be
united, this would mean the end of their national, historical and cultural identities. Their national
economic interests would also be sacriced. B Others say: Only a truly united Europe can protect
its statesnational, historical and cultural identities and their national economic interests from the
challenges of the superpowers [1=A / 7=B]
Regional means to the four above mentioned questions are computed and then aggregated in a
unique index using a Principal Components Analysis (PCA) . The rst factor explains 47 per cent
of the total variance and I call it Closed Social Capital. Results are presented in Figure 2 below.
Closed Social Capital48 seems to be particularly high in Austria, Italy, Czech Republic, Latvia
some regions of UK, Germany and Spain, while it is quite low in Scandinavian countries, Benelux,
France and some Eastern European regions. High Closed Social Capital can prevent the region to
48Note in the map in Figure 2, lighter colours indicate higher closed social capiral (or lack of openess) of the region.
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take full advantage of possible spillovers from FDI because it can isolate foreign multinationals and
avoid its integration in the local economy.
Figure 2. The Closed Social Capital
Indeed, the relation between foreign direct investments in regions with high endowments of
closed social capital, as depicted in gure 2 above, seems weaker than in other regions. The second
element of territorial capital that I deem important for the FDI-growth relationship is the concept of
generalized morality. It is related to the concept of trustworthiness (see Platteau, 2000 and Tabellini,
2010) and characterize societies where rules of good conduct apply to all social situations, making
citizens more reluctant to free-ride on others. I measure generalized morality aggregating answers
to the following three questions of the EVS:
According to you, how many of your compatriots do the following?
- Claiming state benets to which they are not entitled (1=almost all / 4=almost none)
- Cheating on tax if they have the chance (1=almost all / 4=almost none)
- Paying cash for services to avoid taxes (1=almost all / 4=almost none)
Also in this case, regional means to the three above mentioned questions are computed and
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then aggregated in a unique index using a Principal Components Analysis (PCA).49 The rst
factor explains 47 per cent of total variance and thus represents a good summary indicator of
trustworthiness. Results are mapped in Figure 3 below.
Figure 3. The Social Capital: generalized morality
Generalized morality result higher in north eastern, central and south western European regions.
More specically, trustworthiness is higher in Scandinavian countries, Benelux, most British and
French regions, some regions of Germany and souther Spain. It is lower in most regions of new
European member states, some regions of Spain, Italy and Greece. High generalized morality
can lower contractual costs, information costs and transaction costs associated mainly to weak
enforcement of legal systems and lack of information about foreign markets and di¤erent social
institutions. For the same reasons, high generalized morality can also decrease uncertainty and
risk associated with MNEs operations abroad. In this case, the relation between foreign direct
investments and growth in regions with high endowments of generalized morality, as depicted in
gure 3 above, seems stronger than in other regions.
49Results of the PCA are presented in Appendix 2.
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Finally, an important informal component of territorial capital is relational capital, i.e. the
system of bilateral and multilateral relations built by local economic actors among each others. This
capital represent the inverse of interpersonal distance between economic actors in the region and it
is very important to reduce uncertainty in economic relationships and to facilitate the di¤usion of
information. Following Van Schaik (2002), Capello et al. (2011), and Caragliu and Nijkamp (2012), I
measured relational capital as participation in civil society, broadly dened, i.e. clubs and voluntary
associations (sport, cultural, communal), religious communities, as well as unpaid voluntary work
and social activities with friends and colleagues. Applying the same procedure described above,
in this case the rst factor explains 49 per cent of the total variance of the underlying elements.
Results are mapped in Figure 4 below.
Figure 4. The relational capital
Generally speaking, interpersonal distance is higher in the peripheries than in the continental
Europe. In particular, willingness to cooperate seems to be high in some regions of Italy, Greece,
Germany, Benelux, United Kingdom and Scandinavian countries, while it is very low in Romania,
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Bulgaria, Spain, France and most some Italian and Greek regions. Also in this case, at rst sight,
the relation between foreign direct investments and growth in regions with high endowments of
relational capital, as depicted in gure 4 above, seems slightly stronger than in other regions, with
growth rate per se being higher too in the rst group of regions on average.
All these soft components of territorial capital make identities of EU regions very heterogeneous
and suggest the idea that the ability of the regions to take advantage of FDI spillovers might be
very di¤erent along all these axis territorial capital is measured on.
4.4 Empirical strategy
4.4.1 The model
The theoretical framework that describes the link between territorial capital and FDI-growth rela-
tionship at regional level and substantiate empirical analysis is largely drawn from the contribution
by Capello et al. (2011). However, while they dene a neoclassical model to capture the increasing
returns in human capital when studying regional production and regional growth, here I focus on
increasing returns to foreign capital spillovers. This will entail a slight modication of the model,
as I want to concentrate here on the possible spillover e¤ect of foreign multinational rms, rather
than on the direct contribution of FDI to input factor accumulation. For this reason I focus on the
contribution that foreign investments can give to regional TFP or the so called Solowresidual.
Consider rst a simple Cobb-Douglas regional production function of the form:
V Ar;t = Ar;tK

r:tL

r;t
Now lets explicit the impact of FDI spillovers on the level of technology, i.e. A = eaerFDIr;t :
V Ar;t = e
aerFDIr;tKr:tL

r;t
or, in log-linear form:
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var;t = a+ rFDIr;t + kr:t + lr;t
Where lower-case letters indicate the logarithm of original variables. Note that in this form FDI
spillovers enter as an additive term to regional production and not as a multiplicative term. This
implies that regional value added is not necessarily driven to zero if no spillovers take place.
Following Capello et al. (2011), I modify this equation introducing the role of territorial capital.
Territorial capital may act as a catalyst for FDI spillovers, enhancing or daunting their e¤ect on
the general level of TFP. In formal terms, I can assume that the coe¢ cient of FDI, r, depends on
territorial capital endowments, tcr, in the following way:
r = 0 + 1tcr
so that the explicit form of equation (3) is
var;t = a+ 0FDIr;t + 1tcrFDIr;t + kr:t + lr;t
If I take the rst di¤erence of this equation I dene the relation between FDI spillovers and
regional growth:
var;t = 0FDIr;t + 1tcrFDIr;t + kr:t + lr;t
Starting from this equation, I control directly for the e¤ect of territorial capital on growth, along
with country dummies (cid) and sector controls (ssid):
var;t = 0FDIr;t + 1tcrFDIr;t + kr:t + lr;t + 1tcr + 2cid + 3ssid
This equation is the base of the empirical analysis that follows.
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4.4.2 Data and methodological issues
The empirical analysis presented in this section is based on di¤erent sources of data. First of all,
data on indexes of territorial capital derive from the exercise described in section 3 and are based
on EVS database, as already mentioned.50 The three indexes previously identied are transformed
in dichotomous variables that assume value 1 if the region has an index above the European median
value and 0 if the region has an index below European mean. These dummy variables are three
components of the tcr variable dened in equation (6).
As a proxy for FDI spillovers I use the number of new foreign rms51 established in each EU27
region (NUTSII level) during the period 2005-07.52 I use di¤erent measures for FDI, from total
number of FDI to more disaggregated variables, which distinguish between sectors of economic
activity (manufacturing vs. services) and origin of the foreign investors inside or outside Europe.
Data on foreign rms in European regions derive from the database FDIregio, see Appendix 1 for a
more detailed description of the database construction and discussion of the representativeness of
the sample.
Data on gross value added real growth, physical capital and labor accumulation derive from
Eurostat regional database. In particular, as a dependent variable I use real growth rate of regional
gross value added (GVA) at basic prices at NUTS level 2, cumulated over the period 2005-2007. As
a proxy for physical capital stock ratio I use the capital investment ratio: note that, applying the
perpetual inventory method, this implies that the sum of depreciation rate of capital and growth
rate of capital investment is constant over time.53 Capital investment data at nuts2 level are
provided by Eurostat as gross xed capital formation. Finally, I use the total regional labor force
as provided by Eurostat to estimate labor endowments of the region.
50Note that the 1999/2000 release has been used, as the EVS database is updated every 10 years and we wanted to
create a predetermined variable for our analysis. Moreover we believe that territorial capital components are stable
in the sort and medium run.
51 In thousands.
52New foreign rms are classied on the basis of their incorporation date, i.e. the date of registration of the
company name in the respective Business Register at the Chamber of Commerce. They represent mainly greeneld
investments, but this proceeding might include in the aggregate gure also some M&A if the operation caused a
change in the name of the company. However, this component is a neglectable part of the phenomena, see appendix
A1 for a detail discussion of the issue.
53See appendix 3 for a detailed discussion on the assumptions behind this proceeding.
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When analyzing the relationship between foreign investments and economic growth some method-
ological issues have to be taken into consideration. First of all, an issue of endogeneity may occur:
do foreign investors identify more dynamic regions as best destinations of their capital ows because
they anticipate higher future prots, or does regional growth depend directly on the contribution of
foreign investors? The literature that studied this relationship at country level does not provide a
denitive answer.54 This source of endogeneity, though, could be absent in a regional perspective,
given that foreign investors locating in any of the European regions are more likely to be interested
in the whole EU market rather than in the local one, which is surely too small for their prot ob-
jectives (see Mariotti and Piscitello, 1995). In any case, it is important to test be sure that a simple
OLS regressions explaining regional growth in terms of FDI does not lead to inconsistent results
due to reverse causality bias: I will target this issue during the analysis. Moreover, another possible
source of endogeneity could lie in the persistency of FDI ows over time and their contribution to
GDP. To address this issue I will augment the baseline specication including initial GDP level in
a convergence-likeframework.
Apart from this endogeneity-related aspect, another important concern is the possible het-
eroskedasticity and spatial autocorrelation that regional data often display. I will address this issue
by controlling for the specic structure of the variance and covariance matrix of the error terms.55
As a general remark, note that data refer to all regions of EU-27 member states for which data
are available. The only exceptions are EU outermost regions and overseas territories and Romanian
regions.56
54The existence of a reciprocal relationship between FDI and growth is conrmed by Choe (2003) and Chowdhury
and Mavrotas (2006), while Feridun and Sissoko (2006) nd that, according to Singapores experience, it is growth
to determine FDI. An opposite result has been found by Zhang (2001) and partially by Chowdhury and Mavrotas
(2006).
55Note also that I repeated the analysis applying di¤erent spatial model (Spatial Lag model, Spatial Error model
and Spatial Durbin model) and the results are robust to such specications. In addition note that in such analysis
the spatial lags introduced are not signicantly di¤erent from zero.
56For a more specic discussion on this point see Appendix A1.
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4.5 Results
Table 2 below presents di¤erent estimates of equation (7) dened in section 4.1, starting from
a simplied version of the model where only input accumulation is taken into account (Model 1
and 2). Note that model 1 and model 2 are equivalent except from the fact that in model 1 no
correction for the structure of errors is made. Testing heteroskedasticity in model 1, however, leads
to reject the null of constant variance (see Table 1), thus requiring to introduce a correction for
heteroskedasticity - robust statistics in subsequent estimates.
Table 1. Test for heteroskedasticity
Moreover, starting from residuals of model 1, I also tested whether the presence of spatial
autocorrelation may endanger results. Results are presented in Figure 5 below, where residuals
of the regression are plot against their rst order spatial lag.57 No further evidence of residual
autocorrelation arise.
Starting from model 2 and in all subsequent estimates, statistics presented are robust to het-
eroskedasticity.58 In addition, note that country xed e¤ects and dummies controlling for the sector
specialization59 of the region are included in each regression.
57Note that the results presented in gure 5 are based on a spatial lag constructed using a contiguity matrix,
but similar results apply when using an inverse distance matrix. Moreover, note that all regressions are robust to
estimation with Spatial Lag, Spatial Error and Spatial Durbin Models.
58Notwithstanding results of the Morans I, estimates have been repeated also considering possible clusters at
country level and results do not change signicantly.
59As far as sector specialization is concerned, 2 dummy variables are included in the analysis. Both are based on
location quotients referring to employment and consider as benchmark the EU. One dummy refers to the manufac-
turing activity and takes value 1 if the LQ of the region is higher than 1. The other refers to services and takes value
1 if the LQ of the region is higher than 1.
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Figure 5.Spatial autocorrelation
In model 3 the FDI variable has been added. Results conrm that, aside from the e¤ect of
accumulation of input factors, spillovers from foreign rms play an important role in European
regions. Model 4 is augmented to include also the level of GDP at the beginning of the period.
This term is introduced in order to control for the possible endogeneity derived from the persistence
characterizing the FDI variable. Indeed, if FDI ows are driven by agglomeration economies and,
at the same time, they contribute to the GDP of the region in every period, it is possible that this
self-reinforcing process cause endogeneity. As expected, in fact, the coe¢ cient of FDI in model 4 is
slightly lower than the one in model 3, but still signicantly di¤erent from zero. Note also that the
coe¢ cient of GDP variable is positive and signicant, conrming a pattern of divergence at regional
level in Europe, that has been widely discussed both at the academic and at the institutional
level. As argued in the previous section, an additional source of endogeneity could originate from
possible reverse causality or to omitted variable bias. For this reason, model 5 is estimated using an
instrumental variable approach. In particular, I used three di¤erent instruments in this regression:
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the number of newly established rms in European regions in the period 1997-1999, i.e. 8 year before
2005-2007, the second order spatial lag of FDI inows in 2005-2007 and the third order spatial lag
of FDI inows in 2005-2007. The idea is that, precisely because of their persistency, FDI inows are
correlated over time, but at the same time, regional characteristics 8 years before are predetermined
not relevant for explaining growth in the period of interest. Moreover, spatial lags of FDI are
correlated with the FDI inows that a region attract, because of a mechanism of complementarity
among locations. Consider for example a multinational that sets its headquarters in the Netherlands
and drives its suppliersinvestments in Poland or a foreign enterprise that penetrate the EU market
both as market seeking FDI and e¢ ciency seeking may delocalize di¤erent production steps in
di¤erent locations. At the same time, though, growth of a region is mainly determined by the rms
present in the region itself. The possible e¤ect of spillovers from neighboring regions is indeed ruled
out by taking the second order of the spatial lag of FDI, i.e. the weighted sum of FDI inows in
the regions that share a common border with neighboring regions of the region of interest, thus
excluding immediate neighbors. The same reasoning applies to the third order spatial lag.
98
Table 2. Model denition
***,**,* indicate signicance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis.
Note that in order to conduct instrumental variable estimation I use the ivreg2STATA routine
and I partial out60 country xed e¤ect and regional specialization variables .
Summary results for the rst stage regression61 are reported in table 3 below. The diagnostic
60The Frisch-Waugh-Lovell theorem (Frisch and Waugh, 1933, Lovell, 1963) demonstrates that regressing Y a set
of exogenous regressors X1 and on other regressors X2 is equivalent to projecting Y and X2 on the orthogonal
complement of the space spanned by the columns of X1 and then regressing such projections of Y on those of X2.
61Note that this represent the rst stage of equation (3) as subsequent modelsinteractions are instrumented using
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conrms that the instruments respect the exogeneity and relevance assumptions. Moreover note
that the endogeneity test implemented by ivreg262 do not reject the null hypothesis of regressors
exogeneity, indicating that the FDI variable could be treated as exogenous. As discussed in section
3, this conrms the idea that foreign investors locating in European regions are not interested in
the local market directly because it is too small for their industrial objectives.
Table 3. First stage diagnostic
Given that instrumental variable estimation at worst implies a loss of e¢ ciency in estimates
with respect to OLS, but it guarantees the consistency of results, notwithstanding the result of the
the interaction between territorial capital components and the instruments listed for the FDI variable.
62The endogeneity test reported is a di¤erence of two Sargan-Hansen statistics, see the ivreg2 help and Baum et
al. (2007) for further details. Note that the endogeneity test statistic reported is robust to various violations of
conditional homoskedasticity assumption.
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endogeneity test all subsequent models are estimated using instrumental variables.
Model 4 is equivalent to model 3, augmented with the three components of territorial capital, i.e.
relational capital, closed social capital and generalized morality. Results indicate that closed social
capital has a direct and negative e¤ect on regional growth. Introducing also interactions between
social capital variables and FDI inows, results presented in model 5 indicate that relational capital
hinders the growth enhancing e¤ect of foreign direct investments, while generalized morality magnify
such e¤ect. Note that in this last model, instruments for interactions are the respective interactions
between each component of territorial capital and initial instruments.
Overall, thus, results from table 2 conrm that FDI can enhance economic growth at regional
level. These rst aggregated results indicate, however, that the e¤ect of FDI spillovers varies
depending on the specic endowments of territorial capital of the region. Indeed, when interacting
territorial capital components with FDI, it emerges that the impact of foreign investments on growth
can be negative if a region is characterized by high relational capital, indicating that multinationals
are not able to penetrate local networks, increasing relational distance and inhibiting local spillovers.
Results are reversed if the level of generalized trust is widespread in the region, supporting the idea
that low free-riding attitudes increase e¢ ciency of transaction and e¤ectiveness of cooperation
between multinational and the regional economic system. Relational capital is not relevant in these
rst estimates.
At this point it is interesting to inspect more in detail which types of FDI are more relevant
for local economic development and how social capital impact varies depending on the type of
foreign investment considered. To this aim, rst I study separately European investors (model 8)
from extra-European ones (model 9). The former represent an expression of European integration
processes while only the latter can be considered a pure e¤ect of globalization. Secondly I separate
FDI inows also on the basis of economic activity: manufacturing (model 10) versus services (model
11). Results are presented in table 4 below.
Results suggest that the e¤ect of relational capital acts in opposite ways for European FDI, for
whom it could be easier to penetrate the network, and Extra-European ones. The latter indeed,
coming from a more distant business environment, could be excluded from the network and this
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would explain the negative returns of extra European FDI on growth in regions where relational
capital is higher. Finally, the benecial e¤ect of generalized morality as a catalyst for FDI induced
local development is conrmed in all specications. The importance of generalized morality in
magnifying the growth-enhancing e¤ect of FDI is linked to di¤erent e¤ects. First of all consider
that if the level of generalized trust is high in a region, it means that low free-riding attitudes increase
the e¢ ciency of transaction and e¤ectiveness of cooperation between multinational rms and the
regional economic system, thus enhancing the FDI-induced local growth. Moreover, economic
literature (see, for instance, Aghion et al., 2010) highlighted the fact that if generalized morality is
high the level of regulation is likely to be low, decreasing the associated costs and thus increasing
the potential degree of cooperation among economic agents and in particular MNEs and local rms.
Finally, a recent analysis by Burker and Minerva (2012) shows that civic capital inuence the size
distribution of plants: thus larger local rms might have higher absorptive capacity to benet from
MNEs spillovers.
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Table 4. Di¤erent types of FDI: broad disaggregation by origin or economic activity
***,**,* indicate signicance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis.
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Table 4. Di¤erent types of FDI: broad disaggregation by origin or economic activity
***,**,* indicate signicance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis.
A more disaggregated analysis is reported in table 5, that shows results for intra-EU FDI in
manufacturing (model 12), extra-EU FDI in manufacturing (model 13), intra-EU FDI in services
(model 14) and extra-EU FDI in services (model 15). The negative returns of FDI on growth in
regions with high relational capital is conrmed only for Extra-EU FDI in manufacturing activities.
Moreover, the potential of the trustworthiness component of territorial capital to enhance the
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regional ability to fully exploit FDI spillovers is conrmed in all specications.
4.6 Conclusions
The aim of this paper is to evaluate the growth e¤ect of FDI at the regional level, introducing the
idea that development patterns can be very heterogeneous depending on the variety of European
regional identities. The latter are measured along 3 main axis, identifying three soft components
of territorial capital: relational capital endowments, generalized morality or trustworthiness of cit-
izens and cultural closeness of a region. Results conrm that, generally speaking, FDI can enhance
economic growth at the regional level, but they also suggest that this relationship is far from being a
deterministic cause-e¤ect link. Indeed, the impact of FDI is constrained by regionssocio-economic
characteristics, representing their territorial capital, and by the investment characteristics that I
considered as intra- and extra-EU FDI as well as manufacturing and services FDI. In particular my
ndings show that local returns of FDI are boosted by high level of trustworthiness. Moreover, I
found that relational capital has ambiguous e¤ects on FDI-growth relationship, hindering the po-
tential benecial e¤ects of extra-EU rms operating in manufacturing activities on local economies.
Indeed, only regions with high endowments of generalized morality/ trustworthiness benet from
FDI inows and yield a growth premium. This may depend on several factors: high level of gen-
eralized trust implies higher e¢ ciency in economic transactions and e¤ectiveness of cooperation
between multinational and local rms, but it implies also low level of regulation (Aghion et al.,
2010) thus lower costs of cooperation among MNEs and local rms. Finally, high civic capital may
imply larger local rms (Burker and Minerva, 2012), which might have higher absorptive capacity
vis-a-vis MNEs spillovers. Considering relational capital, instead, the e¤ect is more ambiguous: the
network e¤ect can be inclusive and exclusiveat the same time for di¤erent actors.
Such results have important policy implications: rst of all the analysis higlights that FDI can
be an important source of growth for local economies and thus such aspect of globalization is very
important also for local policy makers. Moreover foreign investments impact is a¤ected by local
conditions and in particular by the cultural dimension of local business environment: this result
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makes clear that investments on building a solid social capital in a region are very important also
for their economic returns.
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4.7 Appendix
4.7.1 A1: Representativeness of the sample
This paper exploits a new database, FDIRegio, which has been built up starting from Amadeus
database. It consists of company accounts reported to national statistical o¢ ces concerning 11
million public and private companies in 41 European countries. For each company Amadeus pro-
vides the year of incorporation, the country/region and the ownership structure by nationality. The
data also include the region where the rms were founded, as well as the sector of activity. Firms
newly created during the 2005-07 period whose percentage of assets owned by non-residents was at
least 10% have been considered as foreign. Then they were aggregated in each European NUTS2
region by sector and by origin within or outside Europe. The overall sample includes 264 NUTS2
regions and 25 NACE1 manufacturing and service sectors. A limitation of these data for studying
the geographical patterns of foreign rms is that they include rm level information. This can
potentially bias the location of FDI in favour of regions and/or countries where headquarters tend
to locate. In order to have an idea of the magnitude of such bias I compared FDIregio dataset with
the well known fDiMarkets database compiled by Financial Times Business, tracking crossborder
greeneld investment projects. The pearson correlation coe¢ cient between FDIregio data on the
total number of newly created foreign rms in European NUTS2 regions and fDiMarkets data on
greeneld investment projects is 0.805 signicant at 0.01 level (if I exclude Romania63).
An advantage of this approach is instead represented by the fact that the regional distribution
of foreign rms is directly observed and not indirectly derived from a regionalizationof national
data. Top-down approaches, in fact, are based on the simplifying assumption that the sensitivity of
foreign rms to employment data or whatever it is used to regionalize patterns of FDI is constant
across foreign rms, regardless the internationalization strategy they pursue (e¢ ciency, market and
resource seeking FDI), the country of origin and the role foreign a¢ liates can play within the group
(productive vs. research units).
63Pearson coe¢ cient drops to 0.619, thought still signicant at 0.01 level, if we include Romanian data. This is
likely due to a di¤erent classication of rmsbalance sheets in this country. Indeed, in Romania balancesheets are
collected at the plant level rather than at the rm level. This problem with Romanian data is conrmed by the
comparison with o¢ cial UNCTAD data in table A1. Because of this reason we exclude Romania from our analysis.
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In order to have an idea of the degree of inclusiveness of the dataset, I compared o¢ cial (UNC-
TAD) data on inward FDI ows at country level with the total number of foreign rms extracted
from Amadeus following the criteria described above. Figure A1 shows the results. It is worth
noticing that the correlation between the two measures of FDI ows is quite high. Thus, by consid-
ering number of foreign rms instead of values of FDI I do not introduce any signicant distortion
in the patterns of FDI, though foreign investments in some destination countries have a relative
importance that is di¤erent in terms of number of rms with respect to the value of FDI inows.
Figure A1. O¢ cial inows of FDI (millions of USD) vs. newly established foreign rms (2005-07)
Pearson correlation coe¢ cient: 0.626; p-value>0.000
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4.7.2 A2: Principal Components Analysis (PCA)
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4.7.3 A3. Perpetual inventory method in the context of this analysis
The perpetual inventory method denes the mechanism of capital formation as the following for-
mula:
Kt = (1  K)Kt 1

Pt
Pt 1

+ It
Where P is the industry-level capital goods deator, K represent capital stock and I investment,
while K is the depreciation rate of capital.
Assuming K is constant over time, and that capital investments I grow at a constant rate g so
that
It = (1 + g)It 1
it is possible to derive recursively a direct relation between capital stock and investment in the
following way :
Kt = It
+1X
i=0

Pt
Pt 1
i
1  K
1 + g

So the physical capital stock ratio can be dened as
Kt
Kt 1
=
It
It 1
+1P
i=0

Pt
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i 
1 K
1+g

+1P
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or64
Kt
Kt 1
=
It
It 1
Thus the physical capital stock ratio can be approximated by the ratio of capital investment if
64Assuming that ination is stable, i.e. the ratio of the price level over two periods is constant over time. In the
context of the EU in the years we consider (2005-2007) this assumption holds.
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I assume su¢ ciently constant depreciation rate and growth rate of investments and stable ination
rate.
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